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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Over the past few years, the cocaine trade has enjoyed an unprecedented boom, fuelled by soaring production. In 2018, the combined production for Colombia, Bolivia and Peru – the three main producers of cocaine – 
was more than double that of 2013 (Figure 1). While the rate of growth has slowed 
of late, there is still no sign of it hitting a peak. 
Coverage of this phenomenon has largely focused on the United States and its 
seemingly endless ‘war on drugs’. However, smarter traffickers have long preferred 
Europe, which has far more potential for growth than the more saturated US 
market, and higher profits. Cocaine to Europe has increased over the years, to the 
point where it is now beginning to rival that entering the US mainland. 
‘For 2019 and the first months of 2020, the thinking was that the flow of drugs 
entering or passing through Europe was between 500 and 800 tonnes. We base 
these numbers in part on the notion that we are seizing 10% to 20% of the total,’ 
said one senior European police official and cocaine expert, who was not authorized 
to speak on the record. 
A significant percentage of that flow is in transit to other parts of the world. 
Traffickers are pushing eastwards from the more established markets in western 
Europe towards Russia and Asia – and feeding every country in between. 
From a business perspective, trafficking cocaine to Europe is a far more attractive 
prospect than targeting the US. Prices are significantly higher and the risks of 
interdiction, extradition and seizure of assets significantly lower. A kilogram of cocaine 
in the US is worth up to US$28 000 wholesale. That same kilogram is worth around  
US$40 000 on average and as much as nearly US$80 000 in different parts of Europe.1 
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The US has deployed massive resources in Latin America to fight the drug trade. 
There is an army of Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents on the ground, 
while other agencies, such as the Department of Homeland Security and the US 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, as well as the US military’s Southern 
Command, all contribute to the cause. By contrast, European presence and 
capacity upstream is minimal. Europe has but a handful of police attachés or liaison 
officers posted to Latin America and some scarce naval assets in the Caribbean. 
For Europe, unlike the US, the problems of cocaine appear far removed. Europe 
does not suffer the levels of violence seen in Latin America, nor does it have 
the type of systematic corruption that is prevalent in many Latin American and 
Caribbean nations. As Europe battles the coronavirus pandemic, an economic 
turndown, Islamic terrorism, internal political tensions and irregular migration, the 
cocaine trade has slipped far down the list of government priorities. 
Yet Europe is not exempt from the collateral damage of the cocaine trade, nor the 
distorting effects on the economy that billions of euros of drug money produce as 
they wash through banks and local economies. There is drug-related violence in 
most European countries, many examples of police officers, customs officials and 
port/airport workers corrupted by drug-trafficking organizations, and, perhaps most 
worrying of all, incontrovertible evidence of the strengthening of European mafias 
thanks to the riches generated by the cocaine trade. The story of the rise of the 
’Ndrangheta in Italy (and across the globe), for example, is intimately tied to the 
cocaine trade, while the expansion of the power of Balkans mafias is similarly linked 
to cocaine. The national-security threats presented by these criminal structures is 
clear and growing.
The damage that the cocaine trade is inflicting in Latin America and the Caribbean 
should also be of huge concern to Europe. Many European nations have former 
colonies in the region and overseas territories in the Caribbean. The evolution 
of Venezuela’s increasingly dictatorial and criminalized regime means that many 
European nations with a presence in the Caribbean now have a neighbour 
exporting cocaine and criminality, as well as migrants fleeing the collapse of the 
state and rampant inflation.
Trafficking to Europe 
From the traffickers’ point of view, sending drugs to Europe faces one inescapable 
hurdle. Unlike with the United States, there is no land bridge. Therefore, traffickers 
must move cocaine via sea or air (Figure 2). In the past decade, they have largely 
opted for sea routes, focusing mainly on container trafficking. An elaborate game of 
hide-and-seek has resulted, as traffickers use different methods of hiding cocaine 
among the millions of containers that reach Europe every year. Yet other ways of 
moving cocaine into Europe abound. In November 2019, Spanish authorities seized 
a ‘narco submarine’ that had crossed the Atlantic with 3 tonnes of cocaine, which 
at current European wholesale prices is worth up to €90 million (around US$100 
million). Although Spanish police believe such vessels have been dispatched for years, 
it was the first to be found in European waters.
Well aware that European authorities are paying special attention to containers 
arriving directly from the cocaine-producing nations of Colombia and Peru, traffickers 
are using other departure points around the region. Understanding that containers 
and companies are now being profiled by European police and customs, traffickers 
increasingly use ‘rip-on, rip-off’ techniques, inserting drugs among legitimate goods 
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FIGURE 2  Cocaine trafficking routes to Europe.
SOURCE: InSight Crime investigations
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Although the main air routes for moving cocaine 
to Europe use commercial flights, there have been 
cases of charter flights traveling directly from Latin 
America to Europe carrying significant cocaine con-
signments. Sailing vessels have also become more 
accessible and easier to pilot. And with growing 
traffic between the Caribbean and Europe, this has 
become an increasingly popular way to move large 
cocaine consignments.
Reception in Europe has also seen increasing diver-
sification (Figure 3). Spain has historically been the 
natural home for Latin American traffickers. With its 
linguistic and cultural links, and thanks to an alliance 
with Galician smugglers, Spain became the principal 
entry point for cocaine in Europe in the late 1980s. 
Spain has however been eclipsed by Belgium 
and the Netherlands. Here, traffickers have been 
attracted by the efficiency of the ports of Antwerp 
and Rotterdam, which, combined with excellent 
transport infrastructure, can rapidly send a con-
tainer almost anywhere in Europe. Drug traffickers 
appreciate that kind of efficiency as much as any 
other businessperson, and revel in the sheer volume 
of containers flowing through these ports, which 
provides endless opportunities to camouflage their 
consignments. However, as seizures have increased 
in these ports, traffickers have also switched to 
secondary European ports where there is far less 
scrutiny of incoming containers. Traffickers have also 
shipped substantial quantitates of cocaine indirectly 
to Europe via West Africa and North Africa using 
containers, maritime shipping and drug ‘mules’ on 
commercial air flights. Seizures on this route have 
fluctuated over the past 20 years, but there are 
signs that they may be on the upswing again.
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FIGURE 3  Cocaine-trafficking reception in Europe.
SOURCE: InSight Crime investigations
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As Latin American criminals moved downstream to 
Europe to sell their wares, some European mafias 
began to move upstream to get closer to the 
sources of production and so secure better prices 
for cocaine. Perhaps unsurprisingly, it was the Italian 
mafia that pioneered the move upstream, securing 
cheap cocaine in Colombia and establishing a 
permanent presence in Latin America in the 1990s. 
Buying at the source in Colombia and arranging 
transport back to Europe meant the Italians could 
pocket most of the massive profits themselves. 
Other European mafias soon began to mimic this 
model, and it is becoming ever more common today.
However, it is misleading in today’s criminal 
landscape to think purely of national mafias. 
The cocaine trade is now populated by a variety 
of different types of criminal syndicates, which are 
made up of many different and mixed nationalities. 
There are no longer criminal structures like 
the Medellín Cartel, which controlled cocaine 
production in Colombia and sold their drugs on the 
streets of Miami and New York. Criminal networks 
today rely on subcontracting out much of the work 
to different transport specialists, assassins for hire, 
corruption nodes and money launderers, as well 
as legal actors such as lawyers, accountants and 
bankers. Different criminal nodes will align for a 
particular shipment, then drift apart, searching for 
new opportunities and trafficking constellations.
Impact of the pandemic
The cocaine trade, along with all businesses, has 
been impacted by the coronavirus pandemic. 
According to Kevin Mills,2 who recently retired from 
the British National Crime Agency (NCA) after a 
31-year career and now works as a security and 
investigations consultant in Bogotá, the cocaine 
trade to Europe has been hit on six fronts:
1. Reduction in container traffic from Latin 
America to Europe. In the first months of the 
pandemic, there was a drop in the volume of 
containers coming into Europe. A rise in seizures 
in Europe in the first half of 2020 might have 
been the result of traffickers trying to move 
the same amount of cocaine in a shrinking flow 
of containers, thus running a greater risk of 
discovery.
2. The prohibition on personal travel in and out of 
Latin America. ‘There is no ability for criminals 
and planners to fly out [to Colombia] as there is 
no incoming travel, which makes planning and 
closing deals more complicated, and there is no 
outgoing travel that permits a small but frequent 
supply of mules, or cocaine that is hidden in air 
cargo or suitcases,’ said Mills.
3. The huge drop in sailing craft crossing the 
Atlantic and moving through the Caribbean. 
‘The yachting threat has been really resurgent in 
the past 2–3 years from the eastern Caribbean 
… it is completely dead in the water at the 
moment, because vessels cannot move between 
countries,’ said Mills.
4. Increased maritime scrutiny. The overall 
reduction in maritime traffic means that any 
vessels loitering off the coast of South America 
attract a great deal of attention, and nations are 
now paying extra attention to any foreign vessel 
seeking to dock. ‘The movement of heavy cargo, 
tugs, fishing vessels, again because of the issue 
of crossing maritime borders, has taken a huge 
hit,’ explained Mills.
5. A huge drop in air traffic, including commercial 
flights, charter flights and private planes. Few 
nations are giving the same sort of permissions 
for private planes to land, meaning that charter 
flights cannot operate as before and the overall 
reduction in flying means that illegal flights have 
less traffic in which to hide.
6. Drop in sales outlets in Europe. The lockdown 
restrictions implemented to tackle the pandemic 
and associated economic impact have led to 
fewer parties and most social venues being 
closed, and left people with less money 
to spend. However, Mills believes this is a 
temporary state of affairs and the traffickers are 
already adapting to changing conditions. 
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The future of cocaine in Europe
From the perspective of the authorities, the future of cocaine trafficking to Europe 
holds many dangers. While European and Latin American governments struggle to 
contain the pandemic and associated economic carnage, organized crime sees new 
opportunities. Although the crisis has also presented challenges to transnational 
organized crime, the evidence suggests that it is adapting quickly. If European cocaine 
consumption recovers quickly and new markets in eastern Europe are further devel-
oped, Europe could rival the US in terms of its cocaine problem. Indeed, if huge 
cocaine consignments controlled by European mafias transit the EU on their way to 
other markets in Asia, the challenges could even surpass those faced by the US.
Methodology
This report is the product of field investigations over two years in more than 10 
countries in Latin America, the Caribbean and Europe, as well as interviews with 
officials, investigators and experts in numerous countries across both continents, and 




  Farmers haul sacks of coca in Colombia. © Associated Press; Unsplash
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In September 1989, Los Angeles police broke open the cheap padlock that was the only security on a warehouse in the northern suburb of Sylmar. Inside they discovered more than 21 tonnes of cocaine and US$10 million in cash, packed into 
more than a thousand cardboard boxes. 
The Sylmar haul was – and still is – the biggest cocaine seizure ever recorded.3 It 
also marked a milestone in the history of the cocaine trade, then dominated by the 
Medellín and Cali drug cartels. The tremors in the criminal underworld caused by 
the seizure would be felt not just in Latin America and the US, but also across the 
Atlantic in Europe.
At the time of the seizure, crackdowns on the Colombian cartels’ favoured air and sea 
routes through the Caribbean had seen them grow increasingly dependent on the 
Mexicans’ ability to move drugs across the US border. And the Mexicans knew it. In 
Sylmar, the cocaine in the warehouse was being held hostage by Mexican traffickers 
who refused to release it to its Colombian owners as a dispute raged over payment.
According to the DEA, the staggering financial loss of the seizure drove the two sides 
to thrash out a new deal to avoid any such standoffs in the future. The Colombians 
began to pay the Mexicans not with cash but with up to 50% of the cocaine from 
each shipment. Over time, the model spread, and the Mexicans became not just 
transporters, but also owners of the cocaine and the major distributors in the US.
As the DEA concluded in its official history of the drug trade, ‘[t]his shift to using 
cocaine as compensation for transportation services radically changed the role and 
sphere of influence of Mexico-based trafficking organizations in the US cocaine 
trade.’4 Within a decade, the balance of power in cocaine trafficking to the US had 
decisively shifted to the Mexicans, who established a stranglehold on the US border-
crossing points, reducing the Colombians to the role of suppliers.
The Colombians were left with two options. The first was to fight the Mexicans and 
seek to break their monopoly in order to regain direct access to the world’s biggest 
cocaine market. This would involve not only challenging the ever more powerful – 
and violent – Mexican cartels on their home turf, but also making the Colombians 
priority targets for the United States’ increasingly belligerent anti-narcotics efforts. 
Or, they could cede the US market to the Mexicans while turning their attention to 
new markets with higher prices and lower risks. Markets like Europe.
The shift was detectable in the volumes of seizures. The United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimated that in 1998 – as the Mexicans were starting 
to tighten their chokehold on the US market – 267 tonnes of cocaine were trafficked 
into the US, compared to 63 tonnes to Europe.5 10 years later, the US market had 
declined by 38% to 165 tonnes. The European market, meanwhile, had grown 98%, 
rising to 124 tonnes. Perhaps even more tellingly, the UNODC estimated that by 2009, 
trafficking to Europe was the source of half of the profits made by cocaine traffickers  
in South America, Central America and the Caribbean, while the US market accounted 
for a third. 
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Another decade on, and that gap has almost certainly 
widened. In 2017, authorities in the EU, Norway and 
Turkey seized a record 142 tonnes of cocaine (Figure 4), 
twice as much as the year before and more than  
20 tonnes higher than the previous record, according to 
the EU’s annual Drug Markets Report.6 The report also 
estimates that between 100 and 137 tonnes of cocaine 
was consumed in the region that year.
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However, even at the upper end of this estimate, this would mean European 
authorities seized over half of all the product cocaine traffickers tried to ship into 
Europe, which would represent a startling – and highly unlikely – success rate. 
International law enforcement and underworld sources in both Europe and the 
Americas say they expect around 15% to 20% of shipments to be seized at any 
one link in the supply chain. This would equate to 568 to 804 tonnes successfully 
trafficked into, or through, Europe in 2017.
Yet even this huge figure may not reflect today’s situation. Since 2017, major entry 
points such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, the UK and Germany have all posted 
huge increases in seizures. If these reflect a broader regional trend, the current figure 
may be hundreds of tonnes higher. 
In part, the rise in seizures may be explained by European security forces getting 
better at seizing cocaine. But this alone does not stand up as an explanation. 
Wholesale prices have been in a long-term decline, while purity levels have been 
increasing and retail prices remained stable or fell slightly 7 – all indications that the 
market is not short of product. 
Data on seizures and consumption suggest the US market nevertheless remains 
slightly larger. Quantity, though, is just part of the story. Europe remains a more 
lucrative market than the US. Calculations by the UNODC indicate that the average 
wholesale price in Europe in 2017, weighted by population, was US$41 731 per 
kilogram (Figure 5), compared to US$28 000 in the US.8 
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FIGURE 5  Cocaine wholesale prices in Europe.
SOURCE: UNODC
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Europol estimates that the EU retail market for cocaine was worth between  
€7.6 billion and €10.5 billion (approximately US$8.4 billion to US$11.8 billion) in 2017. 
But calculating using the 568 and 804 tonne range and UNODC prices, then Europe’s 
cocaine wholesale market could be worth between US$23.7 billion and US$33.6 billion. 
However, it is likely that a significant portion of the cocaine entering Europe is in 
transit to other parts of the world.
Risk vs reward 
Drug traffickers, though, not only look at the rewards; they also weigh the risks. And 
while trafficking to the US today is fraught with risk, in Europe the odds are stacked 
heavily in the criminals’ favour. 
The US has waged a relentless ‘war on drugs’ in Latin America since the 1980s, and 
while this has done little to reduce drug consumption or lessen the societal impact 
of organized crime, the Americans have become highly adept at two things: seizing 
drugs and locking up drug traffickers. European authorities, in contrast, have a 
light footprint upstream and have shown limited interest in prioritizing the arrest, 
prosecution and incarceration of Latin American traffickers. 
The differences between the two approaches can be clearly seen in the respective 
law enforcement expenditures. According to the US Office of National Drug Control 
Policy (ONDCP), the US spends US$17.4 billion on supply-side reduction, which 
includes drug interdiction, law enforcement investigations and prosecutions.9 Although 
no such precise figures have been published by the EU, the data available suggests the 
EU spends between US$3 billion and US$4 billion on supply-side reduction. 
Extradition numbers also show the contrast. Although publicly available data is 
patchy, it allows for some comparisons. A European Commission study of extradition 
between Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean between 2008 and 2011 
showed European nations extraditing an average of 61 people from the region a 
year.10 In contrast, between 2002 and 2010, the US extradited an average of 137 
people a year from Colombia alone, according to an investigation by El Tiempo.11 
Europe has one final advantage over the US for the traffickers – it is a far more open 
market. The Mexican cartels maintain their grip over US borders, controlling them 
with extreme violence. In doing so, they maintain their monopoly over much of the 
wholesale cocaine market in the US, reducing traffickers from other countries to the 
roles of suppliers and transporters. But there are no such barriers in Europe, where 
anyone with the capital, contacts and know-how can enter the cocaine market. There 
are also countless routes into the continent. As such, Latin American traffickers can 
significantly increase their profits by selling on the European wholesale market while 
reducing their risk – and European mafias can come upstream to increase their share 
of the profits.
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The changing face of the cocaine trade 
Today, cocaine production is booming. Colombia has seen a year-on-year increase 
in cocaine production since 2012.12 The latest monitoring results from Peru13 and 
Bolivia,14 which according to chemical analysis of seized drugs, account for around a 
quarter of the cocaine entering Europe (Figure 6), show a 36% and 10% rise in coca 





































FIGURE 6  Origins of cocaine trafficked to Europe. 
NOTE: Samples of cocaine seized in Europe between 2015 and 2018 were chemically analyzed to determine where the drug had 
been produced.
SOURCE: EMCDDA/Europol
13THE COLOMBIAN SHIFT TO EUROPE: A BUSINESS NO-BRAINER 
In Colombia, members of the Mexican cartels are an increasingly common sight. They 
dispatch their emissaries to strike deals and to monitor and oversee production and 
trafficking. They have even financed Colombian armed groups to ensure a constant 
flow of cocaine, according to multiple investigations.15 
However, this is not a sign of strength, or an indication that the Mexicans are taking 
over the Colombian drug trade. It is a sign of their frustration with the increasingly 
fragmented and decentralized Colombian underworld and the difficulty they have 
getting the cocaine they need to feed the US market.16 
From the mighty trafficking federation of the Norte del Valle Cartel to the guerrillas 
of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), all of the most reliable 
Colombian suppliers have splintered into a multitude of much smaller networks. 
This makes it difficult for the Mexicans to guarantee the consistent supply of large 
quantities of cocaine they need to keep their supply lines fed. 
For the Colombians, selling cocaine to the Mexicans for the US market still accounts 
for a large percentage of their business. But for many traffickers, the European 
market is now their priority. The kilogram they might sell for US$3 000 to the 
Mexicans goes for more than 10 times that on the wholesale market in Europe. 
With more cocaine to move than ever before, Colombian traffickers have also been 
aggressively developing other markets around the globe, some with incredible and 
barely tapped potential. Markets such as China, with its vast population and growing 
prosperity, or Australia, where wholesale cocaine prices ranged from US$110 000 to 
US$154 000 per kilogram in 2018, according to the UNODC17 – a markup that could 
run as high as over 7 000% for Colombian traffickers. 
The signs of the entry into these markets of big-time traffickers are clear. 
Previously, Asia and Oceania were largely fed by small-volume trafficking that used 
mules or courier mail. However, in recent years, these countries have begun to see 
shipping containers arriving at their ports with hundreds and even thousands of 
kilograms. In September 2019, Malaysian authorities seized 12 tonnes of cocaine in 
one shipment alone. 
Nevertheless, for the time being, Europe’s market size, prices, risk levels and its 
shipping infrastructure make it arguably the most attractive cocaine market in 
the world. When Colombia’s cartels made their first tentative deals with Galician 
smugglers and the Italian mafia to move cocaine into Europe in the 1980s, it would 
have been unthinkable that one day they might shy away from the US in favour of 
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On 30 April 1984, the Mercedes taking Colombian Justice Minister Rodrigo Lara Bonilla home after work was strafed with machine-gun fire by the feared hitmen or ‘sicarios’ of drug lord Pablo Escobar. The Medellín Cartel 
had declared war on the state. And that war was to set in motion a strange series of 
events that would kickstart the European cocaine trade.
The killing of Lara Bonilla – one of the few politicians to defy the power of the 
Medellín and Cali cartels in the early 1980s – sparked a backlash from the previously 
cowed Colombian state. It immediately signed into law the drug lords’ worst fear – 
extradition to the US. 
Fear of capture and extradition drove an exodus of top drug traffickers to more 
friendly climes. Pablo Escobar fled to Panama, protected by his friend, the dictator 
General Manuel Noriega. Others, such as Medellín Cartel boss Jorge Ochoa Vázquez 
and Cali Cartel head Gilberto Rodríguez Orejuela, chose Spain. There they lived 
under false names, collecting opulent properties and high-end vehicles in Madrid, 
according to media reports at the time.19 But in November 1984, they were both 
arrested and sent to the infamous Carabanchel prison.
The two top Colombian traffickers, who would go on to become deadly rivals, shared 
the prison not only with each other but also with Spain’s top contraband traffickers 
from the region of Galicia, among them the smuggler José Ramón Prado, better known 
by his alias ‘Sito Miñanco’. And the Galicians, the Colombians quickly realized, were 
exactly what they needed to expand their business into Europe. These smugglers could 
provide the vehicles and boats to safely bring in anything along the long, rocky coasts 
of Galicia. They could also offer the Colombians one of the most coveted criminal 
advantages: corruption networks that penetrated deep into local elites. 
The time they shared in prison gave birth to a criminal alliance that became central 
to large-scale cocaine trafficking to Europe. It also set Spain on the path to becoming 
the main European entry point for Colombian cocaine and the European operations 
base of Latin American organized crime.
Birth of the European cocaine trade, and 
the move downstream 
In contrast to the US, where the crack explosion had normalized cocaine use  
(around 6% of the population reported regular use of the drug), the European cocaine 
market in the early 1980s was small, according to the US-based National Research 
Council Committee on Substance Abuse Prevention Research.20 But in this small 
market – and its higher prices – the Colombians saw enormous potential for growth. 
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Furthermore, in the 1980s, the US was beginning to 
ramp up its ‘war on drugs’ by strengthening agencies 
(such as the DEA), developing tools such as extradition 
and increasing its upstream presence. The Europeans 
were taking no such action. 
With the conditions ripe for the Colombians to exploit, 
the Galicians offered a secure pipeline into the heart of 
Europe. Galicia, with its 1 500 kilometres of coastline 
crammed in between Portugal and France, has been a 
smugglers’ paradise for centuries. In Fariña, his book on 
the birth of the cocaine trade in Spain, journalist Nacho 
Carretero described how smuggling was not even a 
criminal offence until 1982, and how even after this 
date, it was a socially accepted profession. In the 1960s, 
cigarette smuggling became Galicia’s biggest illicit 
market, and by the 1980s it was a multimillion-dollar 
business that corrupted customs and police officers as 
well as local politicians. 
Fariña documents how the first contacts between the 
Galician smugglers and Colombian cocaine traffickers 
were made in Panama, where the Galicians would go 
to launder their tobacco-smuggling profits. Together 
they organized some test shipments. But it was in the 
Madrid prison where the arrangements for large-scale 
cocaine smuggling to Spain took shape.
To bring in the drugs, Galician fishing vessels would sail 
to Colombia and back, dropping off the cocaine in the 
high seas on their return, according to Carretero. From 
there, go-fast boats and other small vessels would bring 
it to land. Both parties would keep one member of the 
other group hostage until the drugs were handed back 
to the Colombians, who then took care of wholesale 
distribution to European criminal groups, including 
Italian mafia organizations such as the Camorra and the 
’Ndrangheta. For their part, the Galicians earned 30% 
of the profits, according to Carretero.
The impact of the new nexus forming between the 
Colombians, Galicians and Italians soon became 
apparent. Data compiled by the UNODC suggests a 
gradual but steady increase in the size of the European 
market throughout the 1990s, as seizures climbed while 
prices fell.21 
Galicia though, was just the beginning, and new routes 
began opening all around Spain. By 2006, the country 
was recording the third-highest cocaine seizures 
in the world, according to the UNODC.22 Seizures 
were increasingly made outside of Galicia, including 
in Andalusia, Valencia and Barcelona, as traffickers 
began to use other modus operandi, especially shipping 
containers. 
The Colombians’ growing European wholesale business, 
meanwhile, required them to set up operations on 
the continent. Spain, with its shared language and 
commercial and cultural ties, was their natural home. 
And as the European market grew in importance to the 
Colombians, so did the Colombians’ presence in Spain. 
By the first decade of 2000s, authorities became aware 
that this included not only trafficking networks but also 
oficinas de cobro – or collection offices – the name given 
to Colombian criminal structures dedicated to providing 
services to drug traffickers, above all debt collection and 
assassinations. One of the most notorious Colombian 
oficinas to operate in Spain was known as the ‘Señores 
de Ácido’ (Lords of Acid), which was based in Madrid. 
(The group earned its name after dissolving in acid the 
headless corpse of a relative of a drug trafficker with 
an outstanding debt.) The Lords of Acid were directed 
from Colombia by Luis Dávalos Jiménez, alias ‘Pampo’, 
a member of the Norte del Valle Cartel leadership. The 
oficina’s contract killers were involved in kidnapping, 
murders, debt collection and extortion. Colombian 
newspaper El Espectador reported how the Colombians 
had set up the network in an effort to export to Spain 
the organized-crime model of the Oficina de Envigado, 
the original Colombian oficina, which was created to 
collect debts for Pablo Escobar and his Medellín Cartel.23 
But it was not just the foot soldiers of cocaine traf-
ficking that set up shop in Spain. In 2006, one of 
Colombia’s most-wanted traffickers, Leonidas Vargas, 
was arrested in Madrid.24 In 2009, Vargas was freed 
on conditional bail due to health reasons, but was then 
assassinated in his hospital bed as the Colombian cartel 













Medellín Cartel trafficker arrested while living 
in exile in Madrid. 
Jorge Ochoa Vázquez
Medellín Cartel
November 1984 – Madrid




November 1984 – Madrid
Organization Date and place where arrested
Norte del Valle Cartel trafficker who moved 
to Spain around 2004.
Orlando Sabogal Zuluaga
Norte del Valle Cartel
October 2006 – Madrid
Moved to Spain with the intention of setting 
up new drug trafficking routes, but was 





November 2013 – Madrid
Inherited Rastrojos trafficking networks, and 






July 2017 – Madrid
Led an Urabeños’ oficina de cobro, while 





December 2014 – Madrid
Ex-member of the Rastrojos, who ran 
an oficina de cobro for the Urabeños 
in Madrid.
Jhon Marlon Salazar Gómez
Alias ‘El inválido’
Urabeños
May 2014 – Madrid
Responsible for the Oficina’s drug trafficking 
operations to Europe, with allegedly more than 
200 men in his ranks. Arrested in Alicante.
Hernán Alonso Villa Palacio
Alias ‘El Ratón’
Oficina de Envigado
July 2014 – Alicante
Former Medellin Cartel member and 
associate of Daniel “El Loco” Barrera, who 
moved to Spain in the early 2000s. Was 
murdered by a hitman in 2009 after being 
released from prison for health reasons. 
Leonidas Vargas
Caquetá Cartel
July 2006 – Madrid
Top Colombian cocaine traffickers arrested in Spain
SOURCE: Media reports
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Since then, high-profile traffickers from some of Colombia’s notorious cocaine-trafficking 
networks, such as the Urabeños25 and the Oficina de Envigado,26 have also been 
captured in Spain (see the visual above), in one case reportedly while living in the same 
gated community as Madrid soccer stars Cristiano Ronaldo and Fernando Torres.27 
Spain in the new cocaine era
In 2019, the Spanish police stumbled upon a drug-filled semi-submersible that had 
crossed the Atlantic. The vessel had carried 3 tonnes of cocaine more than 9 000 
kilometres along the Amazon river and across the Atlantic, but the crew had been 
forced to abandon it off the coast of Galicia after suffering mechanical problems, 
according to an investigation by Spain’s El País.28 Spanish police sources told InSight 
Crime that Latin American traffickers have used semi-submersibles to move cocaine 
into Spain since the middle of the first decade of the 21st century. Colombian drug 
lord Diego Pérez Henao, alias ‘Diego Rastrojo,’ of the Rastrojos, was a pioneer, often 
operating out of Venezuela, where he was finally captured in 2012. But the discovery 
of the 2019 semi-submersible offered a glimpse into a new generation of low-profile 
Galician traffickers that are now involved in the business. ‘The Spanish groups working 
with semi-submersibles are investing in these operations,’ Chief Commissioner Antonio 
Martínez Duarte, head of the Spanish police’s Central Anti-narcotics Brigade, told 
InSight Crime.
The old guard of Galicians is still active in the cocaine trade, although they have faced 
setbacks in recent years. A network of more than 30 Galicians, allegedly led by Sito 
Miñanco, was dismantled in 2018 in the largest police operation against drug trafficking 
in Galicia since 1990.29 The crime group was linked to two large busts in 2017: a 3.7 
tonne shipment aboard a tugboat seized in international waters, and a 616 kilogram 
seizure made in a container found in Hoorn, the Netherlands.30 
The main players in today’s Spanish cocaine trade do not seek the legendary status of 
their predecessors, instead preferring the protection of anonymity and a low-profile 
life among local elites. ‘[These traffickers] are part of high society and live a normal life. 
Some of them send their kids to the same schools as the judges here,’ Víctor Méndez, 
author of Narcogallegos, a book on the Spanish drug trade, told InSight Crime. ‘Their 
lives are not super luxurious, but they have a lot of money without drawing attention to 
themselves, without the fancy cars.’
Colombian traffickers also remain deeply embedded in the Spanish cocaine trade, 
hiding among a diaspora that has grown from around 10 000 in 199831 to 270 000 
today.32 The ongoing importance of Spain to their operations is reflected in the figures 
– 85% of Colombians convicted of drug trafficking in Europe are incarcerated in Spain, 
according to the Colombian Bureau of Statistics (Figure 7).33 
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Madrid is regarded as a principal operating base, said Chief Inspector Emilio 
Rodríguez, of the police’s Specialist Response Against Organized Crime Group. The 
capital’s luxury hotels are used to meet associates, while reception points along the 
coast are easy to reach from the city. 
All major Colombian drug traffickers working in Europe use Spain, according to 
Rodríguez. Many have established cells in the country, although higher ups in the 
organizations only ever come to oversee the final stages of trafficking deals. ‘There 
are permanent, low-level representatives in the country, but if we arrest a big guy 
from one of these groups, it is always during the last phase of a [drug trafficking] 










FIGURE 7  Colombians imprisoned in Europe for drug trafficking.
SOURCE: Colombian Bureau of Statistics
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The Colombians commonly dispatch shipments with multiple owners, the police chief 
added. Part of the load belongs to them, and they will sell it on the wholesale market. 
The rest belongs to other traffickers from both Europe and Latin America who pay 
the Colombians to source and move their cocaine. Colombian oficinas de cobro also 
continue to operate, policing and protecting traffickers’ interests. While some are 
allied with specific groups, they often work as hired guns for the highest bidders. 
Although numerous Colombian criminal organizations use Spain, one group more than 
any other has caught the attention of Spanish police. ‘We have all types of Colombian 
groups [in Madrid], but lately, we see a lot of members from the Urabeños,’ said Chief 
Commissioner Martínez. The Urabeños sell cocaine wholesale, offer logistical services 
to independent traffickers and use Spain for money laundering operations. 
Today’s cocaine routes are no longer concentrated in Galicia, but pass through Spain’s 
coasts, islands, ports and airports all around the country. Most seizures are made 
on vessels or in container ports such as Algeciras, Barcelona and Valencia, where an 
estimated 40% to 50% of all cocaine in Spain arrives. And the loads are getting bigger, 
as shown by the nearly 9-tonne haul seized in Algeciras in 2018 – a Spanish record.34
Furthermore, other routes have opened up, such as using the hashish-trafficking 
lines that run from Morocco to the beaches along the Costa del Sol.35 ‘The complete 
infrastructure, go-fasts and other boats, for hashish is used to transport the cocaine 
that enters via Africa,’ said Chief Inspector Rodríguez.
However, Spain has now been displaced as Europe’s top cocaine entry point by 
Belgium and its port at Antwerp – a reflection of the critical role of container shipping 
in trafficking today. Although Spain has historically ranked in the top three European 
nations for seizures, recently there has been a sharp drop: from a high of 50 tonnes 
in 2018 to just 21 tonnes in the first 10 months of 2019. Police believe this is a sign 
that, while Spain’s strategic importance continues, its importance as a trafficking route 
is declining. ‘Colombian organizations use Spain as a meeting point with organizations 
from Serbia, eastern Europe [and] Africa, but it is no longer the principal arrival point for 
drugs,’ said Chief Commissioner Martínez. 
Such international traffickers, along with other organized-crime networks from the 
Balkans, the British Isles, the Netherlands and elsewhere also now run their own 
networks in Spain. And while they may continue to work with the Colombians and the 
Galicians downstream in Spain, ever more of these groups are also working upstream 
in Latin America, following the trail cut by the Colombians’ other main partners from 
the cartel era – the Italian mafia.
Spain has been 
displaced as Europe’s 
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Operation Tiburón Galloway began as a local investigation by prosecutors in the Italian region of Calabria in 2001, but quickly snowballed into a multinational, multiagency investigation. Over five years, prosecutors 
uncovered a vast cocaine trafficking and money laundering conspiracy spanning 
both Italy and Colombia – and even the retirement plans of one of Colombia’s most 
notorious warlords.
The investigation into the alliance between Salvatore Mancuso, a commander of 
Colombia’s paramilitary army, the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC) 
and the ’Ndrangheta mafia revealed just how far the Italians had come in the cocaine 
trade – all the way to the source. According to reports in the Italian media, the 
evidence showed that the Italians were buying cocaine from Mancuso in Colombia at 
US$3 000 a kilogram,36 then organizing its shipment through Colombian ports and 
via Venezuela to Europe, where it would fetch prices up to 20 times higher on the 
wholesale market.37
Mancuso, in turn, went into the business with the Italians in Colombia, even opening 
an Italian restaurant in the Caribbean city of Barranquilla that became popular 
with mobsters and local elites alike. And as the paramilitaries negotiated their 
demobilization with the Colombian government, he sent one of his personal fixers to 
Italy to scout for property, according to an investigation by El Espectador.38 
Communications intercepts between ’Ndrangheta members hinted at why: 
‘[Mancuso] is at the end of the peace process, and they will surely give him a couple 
of years in prison, then after he is coming to Italy,’ Mancuso’s chief mafia business 
partner told his son. But Mancuso did not get his retirement in Italy – at least not yet.39 
He was instead extradited to the US, where he served a 12-year prison sentence on 
drug-trafficking charges.
Since then, the European cocaine trade has changed and evolved. But networks 
organized along the same lines as the Mancuso mafia ring are becoming more 
common as more and more European traffickers move upstream in search of cheap 
cocaine and coordinate its dispatch to Europe directly. Nonetheless, it was the 
Italians, with their particular brand of organization, entrepreneurship and criminal 
efficiency who pioneered the approach, and it is still the Italians who have the most 
far-reaching and sophisticated upstream operations.
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Cocaine brokers and the criminal diaspora
Italian involvement in the cocaine trade even pre-dates 
the rise of the Colombian cartels, with records of 
mafia members arrested in Brazil for cocaine trafficking 
as far back as 1972.40 But at first, cocaine was a 
minor part of a broad criminal portfolio that included 
everything from international heroin trafficking to local 
waste-disposal rackets.
When Colombia’s Medellín and Cali cartels began to 
ramp up cocaine trafficking into Europe in the 1980s, 
the Italians were among the main wholesale buyers, 
moving and selling the product that Galician smugglers 
brought in for the Colombians. But they soon wanted 
more, and the Italians’ experience in the heroin business 
offered them a major competitive advantage over other 
European mafias getting into the cocaine trade. ‘They 
exported heroin from Europe into the United States so 
they had a lot of experience and they had established 
distribution and importation chains,’ said Mike Vigil, a 
former chief of international operations for the DEA. 
The more forward-thinking mafiosi understood that this 
experience and criminal infrastructure could be used to 
traffic the cocaine themselves. 
By the early 1990s, Italian cocaine brokers were 
stationing themselves in Colombia, ‘so they could be 
closer to the supply and coordinate shipments to their 
standards,’ according to Vigil. The most infamous was 
the baby-faced trafficker Roberto Pannunzi, dubbed the 
‘Copernicus of cocaine’ by Italian crime writer Roberto 
Saviano. Pannunzi’s first realization was that the heroin 
he had trafficked for years was worth much more 
to Latin American traffickers than the cocaine they 
shipped to Europe. So, as Saviano describes in his book 
ZeroZeroZero, Pannunzi began a drug exchange:  
1 kilogram of heroin for 25 kilograms of cocaine. His 
second realization was that there was far, far more 
money to be made from cocaine upstream.
By the early 1990s, Pannunzi had leveraged his cartel 
contacts in Colombia and his mafia contacts in Italy to 
set himself up as an upstream middleman, establishing 
himself as one of the original cocaine brokers. He 
worked for himself, brokering deals between the 
Medellín Cartel and both the Cosa Nostra and 
’Ndrangheta mafias, but beholden to none of them.
But the cartel era was winding down, with the killing 
of Pablo Escobar in 1993 and the capture of the Cali 
Cartel bosses in 1995, ushering in a new generation of 
traffickers and organizations. Pannunzi was captured in 
Medellín less than two months after Escobar’s death. 
The police officials arresting him turned down his offer 
of a million dollars to let him go.41 Nevertheless, he 
was released five years later after prosecutors ran out 
of time to bring their case against him.42 
By that time, Colombia’s criminal monoliths had 
splintered into federations of smaller trafficking 
networks. For the Italian mafia, that represented new 
opportunities, and their footprint upstream began 
to grow. But the mafia that proved the most adept 
at moving in the new cocaine trade was not Italy’s 
notorious and storied Cosa Nostra mafia, but the 
’Ndrangheta, a relatively minor federation of family 
crime clans from the impoverished region of Calabria.
The ’Ndrangheta plotted a chart upstream by turning 
a weakness into a strength. Poverty and lack of 
opportunity drove a mass migration of Calabrians 
throughout the 20th century, and among their numbers 
were ’Ndrina – the mafia clans that make up the 
’Ndrangheta network. ‘Migrants from Calabria created 
communities around the world and they strengthened 
the connections with the Calabrian region – this was 
the first base of their network,’ said Alessia Cerantola, 
an investigative journalist at the Organized Crime and 
Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) and co-founder 
of the Investigative Reporting Project Italy (IRPI). 
These migrant crime clans not only dedicated 
themselves to crime but also to setting up legal 
businesses as fronts for illegal activity and to launder 
money. Among them were export companies, which 
the Italians used to ship cocaine to Europe in cargo 
and containers – what would become the main 
method of shipping cocaine to Europe.
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This upstream presence allowed the ’Ndrangheta to cut out the independent 
brokers and control more of the supply chain directly. ‘They have their people in 
the key positions in the supply chain,’ said Cerantola. ‘This is not only in Italy but 
also on an international level thanks to the people they located in key strategic 
roles around the world.’
Italian migration was also key to the alliance between the ’Ndrangheta and Salvatore 
Mancuso, who was the son of an Italian migrant from the south-western region of 
Campania, and came from the city of Montería in Colombia’s Caribbean, home to a 
significant Italian diaspora.43 
Mancuso, though, was far from the only ’Ndrangheta supplier, as their upstream 
brokers set to work making other connections, not only with right-wing paramilitaries 
but also with guerrilla insurgents.44 By 2006, as the AUC was coming to the end of its 
demobilization process as part of a peace deal with the Colombian government, the 
’Ndrangheta was handling up to 80% of European cocaine imports, according to a 
report commissioned by Italy’s anti-Mafia commission.45 
The Italian mafia and the cocaine migration 
When Mancuso was extradited to the US along with 13 other paramilitary commanders 
in 2008, it was a watershed moment for the cocaine trade, as the old guard was 
dragged off the criminal stage and a new generation jostled to take their place in the 
Colombian underworld.
Salvatore Mancuso, former commander of









FIGURE 8  Cocaine broker network.
SOURCE: InSight Crime investigations
In the new cocaine trade that developed in this 
power vacuum, trafficking to Europe opened up, both 
geographically and strategically. Over a decade later, 
there are more routes and more actors involved than 
ever before. But the Italian mafia remain at the forefront 
of this expansion.
Police and intelligence sources all around Latin America 
report their presence. In Brazil – today one of the 
main dispatch points to Europe, according to Europol 
– police sources uncovered an alliance between the 
’Ndrangheta and Brazil’s most powerful criminal group, 
the First Capital Command (PCC) in 2017.46 In Costa 
Rica, intelligence sources say the Italians are the most 
common European actor found trafficking in the country, 
while in Peru police report that the Italians are among 
the main financers of cocaine shipments. 
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Brokers, many of them resident upstream, remain 
the lynchpin of their operations, with their 
connections to suppliers and dispatch networks 
(Figure 8). ‘The ’Ndrangheta have brokers in these 
countries, typically in Colombia, Venezuela, Brazil, 
the Dominican Republic and Costa Rica, and 
these brokers try to organize the sales from these 
countries using legal businesses,’ said Maurizio 
Catino, an expert on the Italian mafia and author of 
the book Mafia Organizations. ‘In these countries, 
there are ’Ndrangheta logistics cells for trafficking 
cocaine through the movement of goods for export 
to North America and Europe,’ he added.
An IRPI and CORRECTIV investigation into one of 
these brokers, Nicola Assisi, offered a glimpse into 
how they work.47 According to the investigation, 
Assisi established himself as one of the cocaine 
world’s leading brokers after he inherited the contact 
book of the legendary trafficker Pasquale Marando. 
Marando had worked alongside Pannunzi as one of 
the pioneers of Italian cocaine trafficking.48 When 
Marando was murdered by rivals in 2002, Assisi 
moved to take over the upstream networks he  
left behind.
Evidence collected by investigators shows how Assisi 
sourced cocaine from suppliers in Peru, Paraguay 
and Brazil. He then contracted the PCC to move 
the cocaine to the port of Santos and dispatch it to 
Europe, where his ’Ndrangheta clients were waiting. 
After decades in the cocaine trade, Assisi was finally 
captured in Brazil in 2019.49 
Assisi, like Roberto Pannunzi before him, was an 
independent operator rather than a member of an 
’Ndrangheta clan. Most trafficking networks prefer 
it this way because it avoids the alerts that known 
mafia members would raise upstream, according to 
Esteban Chavarría, the head of the anti-narcotics 
unit of the prosecutors’ office in Costa Rica, where 
the Italian mafia currently has a major footprint. 
‘They do not directly form a part of the mafia in Italy, 
they have not been arrested and they have not been 
investigated, but they know the Costa Rican market 
and they come to form this link, a bridge between 
the mafia and Costa Rica,’ Chavarría said.
The relationship between Assisi and the PCC is also 
typical of today’s Italian trafficking networks, where 
the brokers contract local criminal groups to handle 
the export. However, in some cases, the Italians 
have set up their own front businesses for sending 
cocaine shipments. One of these cases ended with 
murder, when an Italian trafficker who set up a fruit 
company in Costa Rica was gunned down in San 
José after a lost shipment. Chavarría believes it was 
not an isolated case. ‘We are investigating more of 
these structures that have been set up by Europeans 
to carry out this type of trafficking,’ he said. 
Italian mafia operations have been uncovered in 
many other countries that have become – or are at 
risk of becoming – major cocaine export platforms 
supplying the European market. These include 
Ecuador,50 the Dominican Republic, Suriname,51 
Guyana,52 Uruguay,53 Argentina,54 Bolivia,55 the 
Dutch Caribbean and Chile.56 The ’Ndrangheta alone 
operates in more than 30 countries around the 
world, according to European police.57
These networks also manipulate illicit finance flows, 
which they channel through Latin America and the 
Caribbean. In some places, they have turned their 
money into power, by spreading corruption and 
penetrating vulnerable states. 
One of the most audacious attempts to co-opt 
upstream states came on the Caribbean island 
of Curaçao. After gaining autonomy from the 
Netherlands in 2010, Curaçao elected Gerrit Schotte 
as its first prime minister. However, the country’s 
first independent government was compromised by 
Francesco Corallo, a casino owner in the region and, 
according to Italian prosecutors, an international 
drug trafficker who was an important member of the 
Sicilian mafia. Investigations into Schotte revealed 
how Corrallo bribed the Curaçaoan politician to 
gain access to confidential government information 
and to secure the appointment of his relatives and 
allies in critical positions at the Central Bank and 
the Gaming Board and within Schotte’s cabinet.58 
In 2016, Schotte was convicted of forgery, official 
bribery and money laundering.59
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Latin America and the Caribbean are also used as a refuge for Italian mafiosi on the 
run from the law, those needing to lie low or looking to take semi-retirement by 
laundering money in the sunshine. Just such a criminal retirement ring was broken up 
in the Dominican Republic in June 2020, when INTERPOL arrested eight Camorra 
fugitives who had fled Italy after being convicted of crimes ranging from cocaine 
trafficking to embezzlement.60 The men – all but one over 50 years of age – were living 
quiet lives allegedly laundering money through restaurants and tourist businesses.
The Italians are no longer the only European criminals setting up operations 
upstream. More and more groups – above all from the Balkans – have followed 
the path they forged upstream to maximize profits from the cocaine trade. Today, 
it is common to hear of Serbs buying cocaine at the source in Peru, or Albanians 
organizing shipments through the ports of Ecuador. However, the Italian mafia’s 
generations of experience moving both drugs and money, their global networks and 
their proven capacity to innovate and adapt will ensure they remain among the most 
powerful and innovative criminal syndicates, posing serious security threats not only 
in Europe, but also in Latin America.
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  Arms seized from the First Capital Command, Brazil’s most powerful criminal group. © Associated Press
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Cocaine is a criminal steroid. Those that gain access to its riches enjoy accelerated growth and power, usually leaving a trail of violence and corruption in their wake. And today, there are more opportunities than ever 
for criminal groups to access cocaine in both Latin America and Europe.
The cocaine trade has spawned some of the most powerful and notorious criminal 
structures on the planet. In Colombia, it turned a ragtag band of smugglers into the 
Medellín Cartel, which declared war on the state itself. In Mexico, it turned rural drug 
farmers into the heads of multinational criminal conglomerates of astonishing reach 
and power. 
While the US market was initially the main driver of this criminal evolution, over the 
last two decades the growing European market has also played a key role. In Latin 
America, cocaine money from Europe has seen Venezuelan corruption networks 
emerge as major transnational traffickers, while in Brazil it has turned a prison 
gang into South America’s fastest-growing criminal syndicate. In Europe, Galician 
smugglers and Italian mafias were the first to benefit, but they were soon joined by 
others – above all criminal organizations from the Balkans.
The Latin American steroid effect 
In 1976, Pablo Escobar was arrested for trafficking cocaine for the first time when 
police discovered 39 kilograms of cocaine hidden in the tyre of a car he had driven 
up from Ecuador.61 When he was arrested for the second time – after 15 years spent 
trafficking countless tonnes of cocaine into the US and Europe – he negotiated his 
own incarceration into a purpose-built luxury prison.62 Between these two arrests, 
he was elected to Colombia’s congress,63 then waged a successful war against the 
government and police, ordering scores of assassinations and terrorist attacks. And 
he earned enough money to secure a place on the Forbes Billionaires List for seven 
years running.64 
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When Escobar finally negotiated his surrender, it was only after extradition had been 
taken off the statute books and on the condition that he could run his own opulent 
prison.65 Ultimately, Escobar fell not because the state defeated him, but after a civil 
war broke out between different elements of the Medellín Cartel. Many of his own 
people turned on him and waged a dirty war against his network, using Escobar’s 
own tactics against him, while cooperating with the security forces. 
The fall of Escobar sparked the transition from all-powerful cartels to federations 
of smaller trafficking groups.66 But the cocaine trade retained its transformative 
power. One of these federations was the paramilitaries of the AUC, a network of 
allied private armies purportedly formed to combat the threat from Marxist guerrillas, 
but in most cases more focused on controlling the drug trade.67 The AUC employed 
brutal and often indiscriminate violence to secure control of coca fields, cocaine 
laboratories and major trafficking arteries.68 When the group demobilized in 2006, 
more than 30 000 fighters handed over their weapons and their dominion of up to a 
quarter of the country.
Then, as control of the US cocaine trade shifted to Mexico in the 1990s, it was the 
turn of Mexican organized crime. Mexico’s Sinaloa Cartel began as drug farmers and 
moved into marijuana trafficking, but it was the cocaine trade that made their cartel 
what it is today: a multibillion-dollar operation with connections to the upper echelons 
of the Mexican state and criminal interests in as many as 50 countries worldwide.69 
Medellín Cartel head Pablo Escobar
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Venezuela
One of the first major trafficking routes to Europe 
outside of Colombia to emerge was Venezuela, which 
was the main dispatch point for Europe-bound cocaine 
for the first decade of the 2000s.70 The profits from 
this trafficking were central to the rise of the Cartel of 
the Suns – a loose trafficking network made up of high-
ranking members of the Venezuelan security forces 
and government.71 Initially, the Cartel of the Suns was 
little more than a collection of small cells of military 
officials paid off by traffickers to ensure the passage of 
their shipments. ‘Their job was simply to let drugs enter 
and move through the country, they would also guard 
shipments and protect them against hijackings,’ Mildred 
Camero, a former director of Venezuela’s National 
Commission Against Illicit Drug Use (CONACUID), told 
InSight Crime.
However, as the European cocaine money rolled in, 
the ranks of the officials involved got higher and the 
role they played in the trade got bigger. Today, the 
president himself, Nicolás Maduro, his family and many 
of his top lieutenants have been indicted on drug-
trafficking charges.
Brazil
Today, the main trafficking bridge to Europe is no longer 
Venezuela, but Brazil. Here too, cocaine money has 
transformed the underworld.
Profits from trafficking to Europe have allowed Brazil’s 
PCC to complete its transition from a prison gang to 
a transnational actor with influence in Brazil, Bolivia 
and Paraguay. The PCC was already powerful, running 
not only prisons but controlling criminal enclaves and 
running criminal economies (including drug sales) across 
swathes of Brazil, especially in many of the urban slums 
known as favelas. Its recent explosive growth72 is due in 
no small part to establishing control of several cocaine 
corridors, such as that from Bolivia through Paraguay 
and on to the port of Santos, opening up what has 
become one of the most important trafficking arteries 
to Europe, according to Europol.73
Police sources in Brazil, speaking on condition of 
anonymity, described to InSight Crime how the PCC 
charge independent traffickers to use this corridor. But 
the top-level leaders – the cúpula – have also leveraged 
their control over the routes and their growing 
connections to cocaine brokers and international mafias, 
such as Italy’s ’Ndrangheta, to start moving their own 
shipments into Europe.
Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro
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Europe consumes the steroid 
The effects of the cocaine steroid can also be seen in 
Europe. As shown above, the Galicians quickly evolved 
from cigarette smugglers to drug lords,74 with such 
corrupting power over local politicians, judges and 
security forces that by the 1990s debate raged over the 
‘Sicilianization’ of the region – referring to the Italian 
mafia stronghold of Sicily.75 In Italy, the cocaine trade 
turned the ’Ndrangheta from the poor relations of the 
Italian underworld to its richest and most powerful 
actor, far outstripping the famed Cosa Nostra.76 
But the European market was no monopoly, and as it 
grew it also opened up, offering access to the cocaine 
trade to any criminal actor enterprising enough to get 
a foothold. Chief among them have been organized 
crime groups from the Balkans, above all the former 
Yugoslavian states of Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia and 
Bosnia, as well as Albania. 
The Balkan wars in the 1990s opened the door for 
organized crime to flourish in the region. Networks 
formed to traffic arms, people and drugs,77 mostly heroin 
coming from Afghanistan and Turkey.78 The wars also 
hardened people to violence, giving them military as 
well as criminal experience and skills, and created a huge 
diaspora as tens of thousands of people fled the conflict.
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The so-called Balkan ‘Cocaine King’, Darko Šarić, was born in Montenegro when it was still 
part of Yugoslavia but has Serbian citizenship. He mounted a billion-dollar cocaine network 
with connections in both Latin America and Europe with the alleged complicity
of powerful Serbian and Montenegrin businessmen and public officials. Authorities first 
became aware of his activities in 2005, but it wasn't until 2008 that an investigation into his 
network was opened. Šarić went on the run in 2009 after one of his shipments was seized in 
Uruguay. He eventually surrendered to the authorities in 2014 and was sentenced to 20 
years in prison.
The Darko Šarić Network
Darko Šarić
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One of the first Balkan criminals to enter the cocaine 
trade was Darko Šarić, the Balkan ‘Cocaine King’ who 
replicated the model of the Italian mafia by building 
networks both in Europe and upstream. Evidence 
collected by investigators showed how he exported 
cocaine to Europe from Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay 
while compiling a criminal contact book that included 
Russian, Italian and Colombian crime syndicates.79 He 
also cultivated political ties at home, allegedly with 
the Montenegrin Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic80 
and the Serb Minister of Foreign Affairs Ivica Dačić.81 
However, following a multi-year, multinational 
manhunt, Šarić finally turned himself in to Serbian 
authorities in 201482 and was sentenced to 20 years  
in prison.83 
Today, there are no ‘kings’ of the Balkan cocaine trade, 
at least not any highly visible ones. Instead, Balkan 
criminals increasingly apply a ‘crowdsourcing business 
model’ to cocaine trafficking, collectively investing in 
very large shipments, according to the 2019 edition of 
the annual EU Drug Markets report.84 These shipments 
are compiled from multiple sources, with Balkans 
traffickers buying cocaine directly in Colombia, the 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and above all, in Peru and 
Brazil, before organizing dispatch through ports such 
as Guayaquil in Ecuador and Santos in Brazil. Once in 
Europe, the Balkan mafias break down shipments and 
move them on to different markets around the continent, 
in some cases even running ‘end-to-end’ trade – buying 
in Latin America and selling at the retail level, as some 
Albanian networks now do in the United Kingdom.85 
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Tito and Dino Cartel
Edin Gačanin
The Tito and Dino Cartel is led by Edin Gačanin, who was born in Bosnia and Herzegovina but 
was raised in the Netherlands, and started his criminal career by helping the Bosnian criminal 
Elvis Hodžić organize cocaine shipments from Peru to Europe. His organization, Tito and Dino, 
is comprised of family members and friends from his old neighborhood in Sarajevo. They are 
based in Dubai, and predominantly traffic Peruvian cocaine through the Netherlands, but 
maintain connections to the Balkans through money laundering operations.
SOURCE: GI-TOC and InSight Crime investigations
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Currently one of the most notorious Balkan networks 
is the Tito and Dino Cartel.86 Led by Edin Gačanin, 
the organization has a strong footprint in Dubai 
and the Netherlands, and Bosnian police believe it 
controls one third of the cocaine that enters the port 
of Rotterdam.87 The DEA considers the network to be 
one of the 50 largest drug-trafficking operations on 
the planet.88 
The group is now one of the most important inter-
national actors in Peru, intelligence sources told 
InSight Crime. ‘Tito is the main buyer in Peru,’ said one 
Peruvian intelligence agent, who spoke on condition 
of anonymity. ‘He has made connections with dispatch 
networks at the ports of Callao and Piura to send drugs 
to Europe.’ The network has also played a key role in 
opening up routes from Chile, the agent added. ‘They 
have migrated to Chile’s port of Arica in order to send 
drug shipments bound for Europe,’ he said. 
Peruvian anti-narcotics sources said the organization 
previously worked with one of South America’s most 
established trafficking networks, the Andino Cartel, 
led by the Ecuadorean trafficker Pedro Bejarano, but 
The NetherlandsBelgium
Grupa Amerika emerged in the 1990s. It is rumoured that it was created by the Serbian State 
Security Department as a death squad at the service of former Serbian President Slobodan 
Milošević that was made up of Montenegrins trained in the US before the Balkan wars. 
Initially, Amerika was led by Vojislav Raičević, who used to work for the Italian Mafia in the US, 
and it began trafficking cocaine and heroin between Colombia, the US and Europe. After 
Raičević was assassinated in 1996, Mile Miljanić took over the leadership of the group. Today, 
Grupa Amerika predominantly operates cocaine routes into Europe from Peru, where the 
group even allegedly masterminded the prison break of one of their suppliers in order to 
ensure the flow of drugs continues.  
Grupa Amerika
Mile Miljanić
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they severed ties some five years ago. Recent reports indicate they have now cut 
out the middleman by securing exclusive supply deals with four Peruvian crime clans 
dedicated to cocaine production.89
However, according to Serbian organization the Crime and Corruption Reporting 
Network and investigative journalist Stevan Dojčinović, the Tito and Dino Cartel is 
neither the strongest Balkan criminal group in Peru, nor in Europe. ‘Tito is a catchy 
nickname,’ said Dojčinović. ‘Every day you’ll find five articles about this, but the truth 
is there are much more dangerous and bigger players than Tito.’ 
Grupa Amerika is one such player. Led by Mile Miljanić, Grupa Amerika was born 30 
years ago on the streets of Belgrade, Serbia, and today it is one of the most powerful 
Serb networks in South America.90 However, evidence of Grupa Amerika’s presence 
in the region is elusive, with only one high-profile arrest linked to the group. This 
came in July 2016, when Peruvian police captured Balkan War veteran Zoran Jakšić 
in the city of Tumbes as he tried to cross the border into Ecuador with more than 
40 false identities and 10 passports in his luggage.91 Jakšić is suspected of smuggling 
hundreds of tonnes of cocaine into the Netherlands and Belgium, and was a wanted 
man in 25 countries.92 He was based in Argentina and bought cocaine in Peru and 
Ecuador, then turned it into liquid form and exported it to Europe in shipments of 
wine bottles.93 
European groups such as Tito and Dino, Grupa Amerika, the ’Ndrangheta and the 
Galicians have grown enormously wealthy and powerful off cocaine. But unlike the 
Mexican cartels in the US, none of them have the capacity to shut other European 
actors out of the market. Irish, British, French, Dutch, Turkish and Belgian actors also 
play a key role in the supply chain both up and downstream, and InSight Crime has 
also received reports of the growing presence of organized-crime groups from Russia 
and other former Soviet states in Latin America. Furthermore, in today’s increasingly 
fluid underworld, none of these groups have the capacity to run cocaine routes 
from production to retail single-handedly. Instead, they constantly form and dissolve 
networks and alliances with different actors from all across the globe. 
In this decentralized and multinational underworld, criminal networks involved in 
cocaine trafficking are multiplying on both continents. And many of them decide 
to move up the supply chain closer to the source of cocaine production in order to 
increase their profits. All they need is money and the right contacts: a broker that 
can source cocaine and a logistics specialist to traffic it – above all those that have 
mastered the complex world of container shipping.
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It was around 5 am when the MSC Gayane cargo freighter docked in the port of Philadelphia on 17 June 2019. Instead of continuing on to its scheduled destination – the Netherlands – it was boarded by federal agents, who spent 
days using X-rays, sniffer dogs and fibre-optic scopes to inspect the thousands of 
containers on board. In seven of those, they found nearly 20 tonnes of cocaine. 
It was one of the biggest seizures in US history. But the story of the MSC Gayane 
says far more about where the ship was headed – Europe – than it does about the 
US. It shows how trafficking with containers has reached such levels that traffickers 
feel confident dispatching multi-tonne cocaine shipments worth hundreds of millions 
of dollars to Europe. But more than that, it shows the constant criminal evolution in 
what is today the principal form of trafficking to Europe.
US prosecutors believe that the traffickers behind the MSC Gayane shipment used 
a method authorities call a ‘drop off’. Court filings show that two of the six crew 
members arrested confessed to accepting €50 000 (US$58 800) to haul aboard 
cocaine bricks from 14 smaller boats that approached the cargo ship throughout the 
night from the Peruvian coast.
Peruvian anti-narcotics agents told InSight Crime that it is true they are seeing ever 
more drop offs as trafficking through the country’s main port at Callao becomes 
riskier. However, they do not believe this is what happened with the MSC Gayane. 
According to these sources, who spoke on condition of anonymity, it would have 
been very difficult for smaller vessels to pull up alongside the Gayane to pass the 
drugs aboard since its GPS tracking system showed that it sailed through Peruvian 
waters at high speed and without stopping.
Instead, they believe the operation was an example of another trafficking tactic, the 
adoption of rutas frías, or cold routes – ports with little known connection to the drug 
trade that have minimal security and raise few alarms. At least some of the cocaine, 
the agents believe, was loaded in Chile, a country rarely mentioned in connection 
with the transatlantic cocaine trade.
Whatever the case, it makes little difference to the implications of the seizure. Either 
way, the MSC Gayane haul was a product of the ongoing game of hide-and-seek 
among containers between traffickers and law enforcement agencies, in which the 
traffickers are constantly looking for new methods and routes to stay one step ahead 
of the authorities.
The move to containers
In the original cocaine boom of the 1980s, the 
Colombian cartels favoured using light aircraft to 
reach the US, hopscotching across the Caribbean. But 
crossing the Atlantic to reach Europe is an entirely 
different proposition. In the early days of transatlantic 
cocaine trade, traffickers sent small quantities of 
cocaine to Europe via commercial air couriers or ‘mules’, 
according to the UNODC.94 Larger cocaine shipments, 
meanwhile, were often dispatched on ‘motherships,’ 
commonly fishing vessels that were met on the high 
seas by go-fast boats which would bring the drugs to 
shore – a technique perfected by Galician smugglers.
Over the past decade, container shipping has become 
by far the most common form of trafficking into Europe. 
Every year, 750 million containers are shipped around 
the globe,95 but less than 2% of these are inspected.96 
This has provided traffickers with the perfect 
opportunity to reach global markets. The challenge is 
camouflaging large consignments of cocaine to minimize 
the risk of seizure, while maximizing profits. 
Container shipping was used to move cocaine at least 
as far back as the 1990s, when the approach was 
pioneered by the Italian mafia.97 But seizure figures 
illustrate a dramatic swing to containers in the first 
decade of the millennium, which appeared to catch 
authorities unawares.98 European cocaine seizures 
increased rapidly, rising from 32 tonnes in 1998 to 
121 tonnes in 2006 (Figure 9). This was followed by a 
sudden decline from 2006 to 2009 – from 121 tonnes 
to 53 tonnes – even as other indicators such as use rates 
(Figure 10), purity levels (Figure 11) and street prices 
remained stable or increased.99 The figures suggest 
cocaine continued to flow uninterrupted, and traffickers 
had got better at evading official scrutiny. 
FIGURE 9  Seizures of cocaine HCL (kg) in Europe, 1990–2017.
SOURCE: EMCDDA
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FIGURE 11  Population-weighted average price of a gram of cocaine at street purity in constant 2009 euros, 1990–2009.
SOURCE: UNODC
FIGURE 10  Annual prevalence of cocaine use among EU and European Free Trade Association countries, 1998–2009.
SOURCE: UNODC
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By the time seizure rates began to rise again, containers were the principal trafficking 
method detected. The 2016 EU Drug Markets report stated that, while containers 
accounted for 10% of maritime seizures in 2006, that proportion had increased to 
75% by 2012 and 2013.100 
The switch to containers could have been a response to security measures, or simply 
because traffickers were growing more aware of the advantages. ‘Finding drugs in 
containers is like finding a needle in a haystack,’ Damián Zaitch, a University of Utrecht 
professor and expert on organized crime, told InSight Crime. ‘Criminal networks have 
taken advantage of this security gap and are likely to continue doing so.’
It also could be a sign of the fact that the volume of cocaine needed to feed the 
booming European market required the type of bulk-transport capabilities offered by 
containers. ‘When Europe became more important in the world market, containers 
became an advantage,’ said Zaitch. ‘There was a reorganization of the cocaine 
business and it became more international.’
Switching ports and departure points
When authorities began to understand the threat posed by container trafficking, 
they paid more attention to which shipping lines were most commonly used for 
cocaine shipments – and from which countries. Traditional hotspots, such as the 
Colombian ports of Turbo, Santa Marta, Buenaventura and Cartagena, and Callao 
in Peru, offer proximity to production zones, active shipping lines to Europe and 
highly sophisticated, long-standing criminal networks and infrastructure. However, 
shipments from these ports are now routinely red-flagged by European authorities 
and undergo more advanced security protocols. To combat the growing risk of 
interdiction, traffickers migrated to other ports around the region, heading to 
countries such as Ecuador, Costa Rica, Panama, the Dominican Republic, and above 
all, Brazil.
Brazil’s direct connections with production zones in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, 
numerous Atlantic Coast container ports and a powerful and rapidly evolving 
organized-crime landscape made it an enticing prospect for traffickers seeking 
new routes to Europe. The port of Santos became a hotspot, then others such as 
Paranaguá and Itajaí followed. Seizures, according to Brazilian customs data, soared 
from 4.5 tonnes in 2010 to 66 tonnes in 2019 (Figure 12). 
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FIGURE 12  Cocaine seizures (kg) in the ports of Brazil, 2010–2019.
SOURCE: Brazilian customs authority
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This migration continues today, with evidence suggesting that traffickers are turning 
to ports with a relatively clean business history that are ill-prepared to stem the flow 
of cocaine, such as in Argentina,101 Uruguay102 and Chile.103 Another option is the 
more circuitous route to Europe via West Africa, which witnessed a boom in the first 
decade of the millennium104 when cocaine profits fuelled corruption and profoundly 
destabilized local governance. While this route has waxed and waned over the years, 
a spate of seizures in 2019 suggests that reports of the route’s decline may have been 
exaggerated, and that it still is a valid option for transatlantic cocaine traffickers.105 
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Ever-changing modus operandi
The same pattern can be seen in the traffickers’ evolving modus operandi: when 
authorities implemented new security measures, traffickers responded by changing 
and improving their trafficking techniques. When authorities adapted, traffickers 
again came up with new alternatives. 
Early proponents of container trafficking favoured a strategy the authorities call 
‘within the load,’ where cocaine is camouflaged in everyday exports (Figure 13). The 
within-the-load technique requires traffickers to run front companies, which they 
either set up themselves or buy so they can be the owners of businesses with a long 
history of clean exports. They then hide the cocaine in their ostensibly legal exports. 
Mostly, this involves simply stuffing bricks of cocaine into boxes of cargo, but in other 
cases traffickers have used everything from hollowed-out pineapples106 to barrels of 
hazardous chemicals, and even chemically transformed the cocaine to disguise it as 
products such as pet food107 or fertilizer.108 
FIGURE 13  The ‘within the load’ technique.
1. The drugs are hidden within 
legal products being shipped. This 
commonly involves the use of front 
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In addition, the within-the-load technique allows traffickers to have direct control 
over the shipment. However, since authorities began investigating and profiling 
export companies looking for suspicious patterns, the risk of interdiction has risen. 
This drove a shift to the rip-on/rip-off method (Figure 14),109 where traffickers avoid 
profiling by breaking open containers of legitimate exports to ship the drugs, then use 
cloned customs seals to conceal the tampering. Initially, rip on/rip off was favoured 
by smaller traffickers sending tens of kilograms. But as it has grown in popularity, the 
shipments have grown in size, with multi-tonne hauls now commonplace.110
In most cases, the containers are contaminated as they are waiting to be loaded, 
meaning that traffickers have access to the port areas, either directly or indirectly. 
While there has been at least one case of so-called ‘ninjas’ slipping into ports hidden 
in secret compartments in trucks,111 it is far easier to recruit port workers. In Peru, 
for example, the Barrio King gang’s violent control of stevedore crews allowed it to 
enforce a near monopoly on trafficking through the port of Callao. In other cases, 
traffickers do not even enter the port, such as in Costa Rica, where traffickers recruit 
corrupt drivers, transport companies and container-yard workers to load drugs into 
containers as they travel the long road between the agricultural zone of San Carlos 
and the port of Limón.112
FIGURE 14  The ‘rip on/rip off’ technique.
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Sources in several countries also say that traffickers are increasingly looking to 
avoid the risks from profiling by hiding drugs in the structure of the container itself 
(Figure 15).113 Traffickers stuff bricks of cocaine into cavities in the walls, ceilings, 
floors and doors, or in the insulation or cooling equipment of refrigerated contain-
ers (known as ‘reefers’).
Using the container structures lowers the risks of authorities detecting fake customs 
seals, but it requires complicity from people inside shipping companies or container 
yards. Some traffickers have worked around this by mounting front companies to 
tamper with the containers, such as in Costa Rica, where several sources described 
how traffickers set up a container-maintenance company to mask their activities. 
FIGURE 15  Drugs concealed in the container structure.
In the container
structure
1. Drugs are hidden 
in the floor, ceiling 
or walls.
2. Refrigerated containers, 
known as ‘reefers,’ are 
frequently used since they 
have refrigeration 










Authorities responded to the rise in these trafficking methods with the use of scan-
ners in ports, which are deployed both at random and as a result of risk profiling. 
However, in some locations, such as the port of Santos in Brazil, traffickers have 
responded by contaminating containers that have already been inspected – cracking 
them open at the last possible moment before loading.
The surest way to avoid security measures, though, is the technique US prosecutors 
believe was used for the MSC Gayane shipment: a ‘drop off’ where the containers are 
contaminated at sea after the ship has left the port.
This technique usually depends on extensive corruption among the crew. But author-
ities in Guayaquil, Ecuador, also report that armed bands are now boarding ships and 
forcing crews to take loads at gunpoint. Drop offs are now not only happening as 
ships set sail, but also as they pass through the waters of other nations, with sources 
reporting the state of Falcón in Venezuela as a particular hotspot. 
Authorities are tackling this trafficking method using the vessel’s GPS device, which 
gives information on the speed of the ship. If a ship suddenly slows down or stops, an 
alarm sounds. Traffickers, though, are already exploring new options. Anti-narcotics 
and port officials are talking of the ‘switch’ technique, which consists of swapping 
drugs to ‘cold’ or non-flagged containers in transit. This risk is especially high in 
Panama, port officials explained to InSight Crime, as drugs can be switched as they 
move by rail between the Pacific and Atlantic coasts.
FIGURE 16  The ‘drop off’ technique.
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Drop off
1. When the freighter leaves the port,
small vessels or speedboats approach the 
ship, then pass the drugs to crew members.
2. Then they pack them into 
a container on board.
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The future of the container battle 
While drug traffickers may have enjoyed a head start in 
container smuggling, it is now an anti-narcotics priority 
for authorities on both sides of the Atlantic. Some 
in both the public and private sectors are betting on 
smart containers, which collect and transmit data on 
the container’s geolocation, temperature fluctuations 
and any other signs of tampering,114 or electronic 
customs seals, which send real-time information on the 
container’s movement.115
However, a port official in Panama, who spoke to 
InSight Crime on condition of anonymity, said that 
smart containers are prohibitively expensive and 
complicated to build or install. They also can lose signal 
at sea, creating a window of opportunity for traffickers 
to contaminate containers. ‘These are great ideas, but 
they are also a utopia,’ he said.
More grounded solutions can be found in multinational 
cooperation and initiatives such as the Container 
Control Programme, a joint initiative of the UNODC 
and the World Customs Organization. The programme 
has increased security capacity and built international 
cooperation networks in both Latin American and 
European ports, and has directly contributed to an 
increase in seizures as well as operations that took 
down important traffickers.116 
However, despite these efforts, it is unlikely that 
authorities will ever be able to shut down container 
trafficking. It is impossible to inspect even a fraction of 
the hundreds of millions of containers that are shipped 
worldwide. And even if they manage to restrict it 
enough to make traffickers consider turning elsewhere, 
traffickers have no shortage of other options.
Sailing vessels are also becoming more accessible 
in price and easier to pilot, and are now dispatched 
from Brazil and Suriname, as well as Venezuela and 
the Caribbean. Private charter flights loaded with 
hundreds of kilograms of cocaine have also been sent 
from Colombia117 and Uruguay118 to the UK, France and 
Switzerland. And since 2018, there have been the first 
seizures in Europe of semi-submersibles built to ship 
cocaine.119 Whether it is in container trafficking or not, 
the game of cocaine hide-and-seek has anti-narcotics 
authorities, for now, condemned to playing catch up.
The war for ports 
The importance of containers has changed the face  
of cocaine trafficking in Latin America. It has turned 
port cities with little history of organized crime into 
sought-after criminal real estate, sparking struggles  
for domination and the strengthening of local cri- 
minal syndicates.
Because of trafficking through ports, street gangs such 
as Panama’s Calor Calor and Baghdad have become 
major criminal players, and Brazil’s already formidable 
prison gangs, above all the PCC, have become large-
scale traffickers whose leaders broker transnational 
deals. It has also given rise to a new generation of 
port-logistics specialists, whom traffickers contract to 
organize cocaine dispatches. Such specialists operate 
camouflaged among local elites in countries such as 
Ecuador, the Dominican Republic and Costa Rica.
The collateral damage of these new criminal dynamics 
has been high. In recent years, Panama has seen waves 
of murders, fuelled in no small part by gang wars for 
control of the ports of Panama City and Colón.120 
In Callao, Peru, Barrio King’s campaign to establish 
a monopoly on trafficking through the port led not 
only to inter-gang violence, but also a brutal purge of 
stevedores who resisted their control. And these are far 
from isolated examples.121 
European port cities have also seen their share of 
violence, although on a smaller scale. Since 2018, the 
two main European ports used for cocaine trafficking 
47
– Rotterdam in the Netherlands and Antwerp in Belgium – have seen gangland 
killings, bombings and grenade attacks connected to the cocaine trade. 122
However, violence and intimidation are clumsy tools in Europe. They attract too much 
attention and are bad for business. Even in Latin America, which has suffered more 
drug violence than any other part of the world, traffickers are beginning to realize this. 
Container trafficking in both Europe and the Americas relies far more on corruption 
than violence. Without access to corrupt port workers and officials, customs agents, 
police, ship crews and others, it would be impossible. And this is a broader reflection 
of the cocaine-trafficking world today, which increasingly favors plata – silver – over 
plomo – lead.
w
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  Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. © Associated Press
THE RISE OF PLATA 
OVER PLOMO
THE CANCER OF CORRUPTION
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In July 2020, British drug trafficker Robert Dawes was sentenced to 22 years in prison for his role in one of the most high-profile European drug-trafficking cases of the last decade: the 2013 attempt to smuggle almost 1.4 tonnes of cocaine on 
an Air France flight from Caracas to Paris. 
There is only one way to import 1.4 tonnes of cocaine using a commercial airline – 
high-level and widespread corruption. In Venezuela, the operation not only involved 
corrupt airport workers and National Guard but also top-ranking state officials. 
In France, it involved an incarcerated French trafficker who was to arrange the 
reception of the drugs from the airport in France. And at the centre of it all was 
Dawes, a transnational, poly-drug trafficker with contacts in high places and corrupt 
port officials in his pocket all around the world, according to Rob Hickinbottom, who 
led the investigation by the British NCA into Dawes. The case exposed how the key 
to cocaine trafficking today is less the extreme violence with which the trade has 
become synonymous but rather corruption. And it showed the cancerous effects of 
the cocaine trade, which corrupts states wherever it spreads, eroding capacity and, in 
the more extreme cases, democracy. 
Plomo o plata
Drug traffickers have two main weapons at their disposal, captured in Pablo Escobar’s 
offer to those whose cooperation he sought: ‘plomo o plata’ – silver or lead, meaning 
money or death. Since Escobar’s time, it is plomo that has been most connected to 
the cocaine trade: from the Medellín Cartel blowing up airliners to Mexican cartels 
hanging bodies from bridges or tossing severed heads onto dancefloors.
Europe has not had to endure the same levels of bloodshed as Latin America, but it 
too has seen extreme violence resulting from the cocaine trade. The cocaine trade 
is to blame for rising gun crime in Britain, according to Hickinbottom, who now 
heads the UK’s National Firearms Targeting Centre. ‘Our firearms cases and firearms 
seizures are 99% linked to the drugs war,’ he said. Police sources in Spain paint a 
similar picture, blaming drug-trade disputes for the bulk of the country’s murders.
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Even the Netherlands, which has one of the lowest homicide rates in Europe, has 
seen a severed head left as a narco-message, while innocent bystanders have been 
gunned down in drug disputes. A family member and a lawyer of a witness in a 
major cocaine-trafficking case were murdered in April 2018 and September 2019 
respectively.123 In July 2020, an ‘underworld prison’ with multiple cells and a torture 
room that was set up by a cocaine-trafficking group was discovered.124 
However, while today’s drug traffickers remain more than willing to use extreme 
violence, they also understand that this is what led to the downfall of many of 
their predecessors. Violence, particularly extreme violence, creates headlines and 
draws the attention of authorities. Instead, plata is the weapon of choice today for 
transnational organized crime. 
Corruption from drug trafficking penetrates the state at all levels, from police 
patrolmen to presidents. And it targets all branches of the state: the judicial, 
legislative and executive as well as the security forces. It has put justice up for sale 
in many Latin American countries, and seen police and military not only facilitate, 
but participate in, drug trafficking and even murder. And it has placed certain 
governments at the service of organized crime, at local and even national levels.
Venezuela and the Air France smuggling 
incident 
The Air France case highlights perhaps the starkest example of the corrosive power of 
corruption in the cocaine trade – Venezuela. 
The involvement of Venezuelan security forces in the cocaine trade dates back as far 
as the early 1990s, but the combination of Hugo Chávez coming to power in 1999 and 
a boom in trafficking through Venezuela to Europe helped deepen the relationship, 
with profound implications for the country.125 ‘This was a process that did not happen 
overnight, but gradually,’ Mildred Camero, a former director of Venezuela’s CONACUID 
in the Chávez administration told InSight Crime. ‘It developed more with the arrival of 
Chávez as he allowed the military to get involved in drug trafficking in exchange for its 
loyalty.’
For Chávez, ‘it was a strategic decision’ to turn a blind eye to cocaine trafficking, added 
Camero, who describes how she was removed from her position after reporting to 
Chávez that his generals were involved in trafficking cocaine. Chávez’s tolerance of 
cocaine trafficking secured the loyalty of the corrupt security-forces leadership – a 
priority for the president after the 2002 attempted coup against him. It also helped 
another ally, the FARC, which Chávez supported out of ideological sympathy and as a 
bulwark against Colombia and the US, given that the FARC was heavily involved in the 
cocaine trade all along the Venezuela–Colombia border. 
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Mural of ex-Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez.
Chávez could not, or would not, contain the corruption he had permitted, and 
tolerance soon slid into complicity. The Bolivarian National Guard (GNB) and other 
branches of Venezuela’s military went from allowing trafficking to purchasing, storing, 
transporting and selling cocaine,126 which they sourced directly from the FARC.127 ‘They 
sold weapons for drugs, it was an exchange,’ said Camero. ‘Many FARC weapons had 
the insignias of the Venezuelan Bolivarian Republic.’
When Chávez died in March 2013, the cabal of Chavista leaders that replaced 
him included numerous military and political leaders who now stand accused of 
drug trafficking. Among them is not only Chávez’s hand-picked successor, Nicolás 
Maduro, but also government ministers, regional governors and senior security and 
intelligence officials.128 
According to NCA investigations, it was shortly after Maduro came to power when 
Robert Dawes dispatched his emissaries to meet with a British national known as 
‘Charlie Brown,’ who was his upstream connection with the Cartel of the Suns network 
(see below). Together, they made the arrangements for the Air France shipment.
Months later, on 10 September 2013, more than 30 suitcases filled with cocaine 
arrived at Simón Bolívar International Airport (Maiquetía Airport) in Caracas. The 
suitcases were brought in through a workers’ entrance to avoid scanners and baggage 
checks.129 They had stickers with counterfeit barcodes that were accepted by the Air 
France luggage system despite not belonging to any travellers.130 
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Reception of the cocaine in France was then to be handled by one of France’s biggest 
marijuana traffickers, the incarcerated Sofiane Hambli, according to the testimony 
of Hambli himself.131 However, unknown to Dawes and his Venezuelan partners, the 
operation was compromised. British undercover operatives in Venezuela had warned 
the French of an impending shipment using an Air France flight, and the French 
had set up a controlled handover operation, according to sources familiar with the 
investigation. And Hambli was a collaborator with a French police unit, the Central 
Office for the Suppression of Illicit Drug Trafficking.
The seizure made international headlines and Venezuela came under pressure to 
respond. Authorities initially made 27 arrests, including airport workers, low-ranking 
members of the GNB (which is responsible for security at Venezuela’s airports) and 
Ernesto Mora Carvajal, the GNB lieutenant colonel – and Hugo Carvajal’s nephew 
– who headed the airport’s security. Seven airport workers and three GNB officials 
later received sentences of between 10 and 22 years in prison. Carvajal, however, 
was quickly declared innocent and released. 
There was little doubt that the true masterminds were much higher up. In 2020, the 
US Department of Justice accused President Maduro, Hugo Carvajal and Diosdado 
Cabello of involvement in the case.132 Among the evidence were communications 
intercepts in which Maduro told Carvajal and Cabello shortly after the seizure that 
‘they should not have used Maiquetía Airport for drug trafficking’ and should stick to 
established trafficking routes.
Corruption from drug 
trafficking penetrates 
the state at all levels, 
from police patrolmen 
to presidents.
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In 2013, a multinational network of cocaine traffickers attempted to move nearly 1.4 tonnes of cocaine on a commercial 
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Ex-Suriname president Dési Bouterse. 
© Pieter Van Maele
Cocaine corruption in Latin America 
Venezuela is not the only example of a nation suffering corruption due to cocaine-
trafficking routes to Europe. The former Dutch colony of Suriname was long ruled 
by Dési Bouterse, first as a dictator and then as an elected president. He allegedly 
had contact with Pablo Escobar133 and did arms-for-drugs deals with the FARC in 
the 1990s.134 In 1999, Bouterse was convicted in absentia as the mastermind behind 
a shipment of cocaine to the Netherlands. ‘It is clear that there are links between 
the state and the underworld in Suriname,’ former Surinamese diplomat and political 
analyst Martin Schalkwijk told InSight Crime. 
In Ecuador – now one of the main dispatch points to Europe – the highest levels 
of the state have been accused of involvement in drug trafficking. In the previous 
administration of Rafael Correa, there were narco scandals involving government 
ministers, presidential allies and even the president himself.135 Underworld sources 
in Ecuador, who spoke on condition of anonymity, described to InSight Crime how 
police, armed forces, judges, prosecutors, public registrars, mayors, governors and 
even figures in the national government are all on the payroll of cocaine traffickers.  
‘If you’re not corrupt, then they will corrupt you,’ said one, who has first-hand 
knowledge of drug trafficking in the Colombia border region.136
Another major dispatch point to Europe to emerge over the past decade is the 
Dominican Republic, a longtime transit route to the US. Once again, the increase in 
trafficking through the country has deepened already high levels of corruption. ‘In the 
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Dominican Republic, decades of corruption have made 
politics a partner of drug trafficking, and today this 
has reached exorbitant levels,’ said Carlos de Peña, an 
investigator with the Latin American Faculty of Social 
Sciences in the Dominican Republic. 
Drug trafficking co-opts politicians from the local to 
the national level. Sources say candidates for municipal 
elections are routinely bankrolled by traffickers, while 
President Danilo Medina has faced scrutiny over his 
alleged links to the wife of one of the island’s most 
notorious cocaine traffickers, César Emilio Peralta, 
alias ‘el Abusador’.137 Factions of the Dominican 
security forces, meanwhile, have crossed the line from 
corruption to criminal actors, participating in everything 
from murder-for-hire to international drug trafficking, 
according to Dominican prosecutors.138 The former 
director of the country’s anti-narcotics police was even 
convicted of stealing nearly a tonne of cocaine.139 
Air France: The twist in the tale 
Today, few Latin America and the Caribbean countries 
have escaped corruption associated with cocaine 
trafficking. But while such top-level corruption seems 
unthinkable in Europe, further twists in the Air France 
case show that Europe is far from immune. 
The story of the seizure presented by the head of 
the Central Office for the Suppression of Illicit Drug 
Trafficking, François Thierry, was that a corrupted 
luggage handler at the airport in Paris was supposed to 
get the drugs through the airport but switched sides 
and told a police informant of the operation.
But Sofiane Hambli had a different version of events. 
During a court hearing, he claimed that, while 
incarcerated, he had organized the operation to 
remove the drugs from the airport in coordination with 
the police.140 Hambli’s claims to have organized the 
handover are also supported by a confidential letter 
from Thierry to the Attorney General signed on 28 
October 2015 and seen by InSight Crime. In the letter, 
Thierry praises Hambli for his work, including for his 
contribution to the seizure of 1.4 tonnes of cocaine. 
Hambli’s cooperation with law enforcement, which 
dated back to when Thierry recruited him in 2009, 
earned him an early release from prison. However, 
there is evidence to suggest it may have also earned 
him and Thierry – at that time one of France’s top anti-
narcotics police – a lot more. In 2016, an investigation 
by Libération uncovered how Hambli and Thierry’s 
partnership was littered with examples of suspicious 
behaviour. There were unauthorized operations and 
loads of drugs arriving and then disappearing.141 A 
2017 Libération investigation recorded how customs 
officials noted that Thierry had picked up 50 kilogram 
suitcases from the airport on a weekly basis for several 
months in 2010.142 Thierry claimed that the suitcases 
were fake shipments from Bogotá that he was passing 
through to give credibility to an informant, but 
prosecutors could find no records of the operations 
in either France or Colombia. Further muddying the 
picture was the fact that Thierry’s then girlfriend acted 
as Hambli’s lawyer, even though her expertise is not in 
criminal but real-estate law.143 
After reviewing case files and official documents and 
interviewing several key actors, Libération concluded 
that the ‘only certainty [is that] Sofiane H. would 
go onto establish himself as the biggest trafficker in 
France thanks to the protection of François Thierry’.144 
Thierry attempted to sue Libération for libel over 
the story but the case was thrown out. In August 
2017, Thierry was indicted for complicity in drug 
trafficking.145 Two years later he was indicted again for 
participation in a criminal association, among other 
offences.146 In September 2020 the French Supreme 
Court rejected Thierry’s appeal over the August 2017 
case, which concerned a 7.1 tonne marijuana seizure. 
Emmanual Fansten, the Libération journalist who broke 
the story, told InSight Crime that the cases remain 
under investigation and Thierry remains an official 
of the Interior Ministry. When questioned by InSight 
Crime, the French Interior Ministry did not deny or 
confirm this, nor reply to our other inquiries about  
the cases.
Hambli was rearrested in 2016 but then released after 
a two-year pretrial detention, according to Fansten, 
and remains at large.
56 THE COCAINE PIPELINE TO EUROPE
The corruption cancer in Europe
Corruption in Europe might not be as widespread as in Latin America, but according 
to Europol, it is on the rise.147 The first European mafias to capitalize on large-scale 
cocaine trafficking – the Galicians and the Italian mafia – already worked in spaces 
where they were able to penetrate and co-opt the state. But their participation in 
the cocaine trade took corruption to new levels. Armed with cocaine money, the 
Galicians infiltrated government institutions, the legal economy and politics at an 
unprecedented level. 
In Italy, cocaine riches have helped organized crime continue to penetrate the 
state even as anti-corruption measures have broken up old ways of working.148 In 
December 2019, Italian military police arrested more than 300 people on suspicion 
of membership of the ’Ndrangheta – the second-biggest mafia bust in Italy’s history. 
Suspects included politicians, lawyers, accountants, a local police chief and a former 
member of the Italian parliament within ex-Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza 
Italia party.149 ‘The level of infiltration and control [the ’Ndrangheta] have is worrying 
and is going to next levels – we’re talking about people who are highly educated, 
white-collar,’ said Alessia Cerantola, an investigative journalist at OCCRP and 
co-founder of IRPI. 
When organized crime from the Balkans moved into the cocaine trade, the 
region’s already weak and corrupt institutions proved easily corrupted. As Chief 
Commissioner Antonio Martínez Duarte, head of the Spanish police’s Central Anti-
Narcotics Brigade told InSight Crime, countries such as Italy and Spain have more 
capacity to address corruption today, but similar efforts have yet to develop in 
eastern Europe. ‘In eastern Europe there is less administrative control, and possibly 
less control on corruption,’ he said.
There have been numerous cases linking Balkans politicians and police to drug traf-
ficking, especially in Serbia. In 2009, the head of the Serbian police Ivica Dačić faced 
corruption accusations after he was twice captured on camera meeting with drug 
lord Rodoljub Radulović.150 Dačić was never charged. He managed to survive the 
scandal and is now the Serbian Minister of Foreign Affairs.151 
Nonetheless, the biggest threat of corruption usually comes at the points where 
cocaine enters Europe. Here, people on the ground, such as port workers or customs 
officials, can make the difference between trafficking success and a law enforcement 
seizure. In the port of Rotterdam, for example, several customs officers have been 
arrested for participating in drug trafficking, including one officer who earned millions 
waving through contaminated containers before he was arrested and sentenced to 
14 years in prison in 2017.152 
Europe’s cocaine corridors are currently evolving and expanding; all of its 20 busiest 
container ports have seen cocaine seizures of more than 100 kilograms in the past 
three years. Meanwhile, cocaine routes are opening up all around Latin America, 
from the ports of the Southern Cone countries to the mouth of the Amazon river. 
Wherever these new routes go, the cancer of corruption follows. The future of the 
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The flow of cocaine to Europe may have suffered along with most licit businesses due to the coronavirus crisis, but few believe the damage to the drug trade will be permanent. The pandemic has accelerated certain aspects 
of the evolution of cocaine smuggling that will shape its future.
The production of cocaine
What is not likely to change in the short term is the growth in the supply of cocaine 
to Europe, as the cultivation of coca appears set to remain steady, or indeed 
increase, in the three producer nations of Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. In Colombia, 
the government of President Iván Duque is not only struggling with the economic 
fallout of the coronavirus crisis, but also with an increase in violence linked to the civil 
conflict (now in its sixth decade) combined with social unrest. The US, desperate to 
stem the exponential growth of cocaine production, is pushing Colombia to restart 
the aerial spraying of coca crops with glyphosate chemicals. There is resistance to 
this from many sectors of Colombian society due to damage the chemicals cause to 
the environment and to public health. Peru and Bolivia are in the grip of their own 
political crises and the fight against drugs has fallen far down the list of government 
priorities, even as coca cultivation rises.
Political chaos throughout much of Latin America 
Even before the pandemic, Latin America and the Caribbean were facing the 
challenges of sharply contracting economies, unsustainable debt and deepening 
inequality, prompting social turmoil. All of this has lowered state resilience to orga-
nized crime and drug trafficking and allowed powerful drug-trafficking organizations 
to penetrate key state institutions, enabling the free flow of cocaine shipments on 
their way to Europe.
This situation has been exacerbated by the impact of the pandemic, particularly 
in the two nations which are crucial to the flow of cocaine to Europe: Brazil 
and Venezuela. Brazil is deep in crisis, with more than 6 million infected by the 
coronavirus as of November 2020. President Jair Bolsonaro’s government is under 
investigation for corruption, while the record deforestation of the Amazon under his 
stewardship has soured relations with several European nations. All of this, combined 
with the growing power of the Brazilian PCC, with its deepening involvement in the 
international drug trade and control of key ports, means that there is little resistance 
to the flow of cocaine through Brazil.
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Venezuela is the principal transit nation for Colombian cocaine moving into the 
Caribbean and then onto Europe, as well as some illegal air traffic to West Africa. 
Despite international sanctions and constant US pressure, President Nicolás Maduro’s 
grip on power appears undiminished. This failed state is not only facilitating the 
cocaine trade, but has also become a regional crime hub led by senior figures in the 
Chavista regime, with zero resistance to the flow of cocaine to Europe.
Continuing expansion of the European drug market 
According to EU analysis, the availability of cocaine to consumers in Europe is likely 
at an all-time high, and consumption rates continue to climb.153 While the countries 
with the highest consumption rates continue to be western and southern European 
nations, the EU’s 2019 Drug Markets Report also cited evidence of expanding retail 
markets in northern and eastern Europe.
The coronavirus restrictions have likely hit cocaine consumption, with the reduction 
in social interaction, the closing of large-scale party venues, etc. It remains to be seen 
if these conditions hit the cocaine trade in any permanent fashion, or if the current 
situation provides nothing more than a temporary disruption to drug consumption 
across Europe.
Increasingly sophisticated game of hide-and-seek in  
container traffic 
Container shipping remains the principal way to move large cocaine shipments into 
Europe. While European law enforcement is very aware of the threat and dedicating 
increasing resources to the tracking and searching of suspect containers, the crimi-
nals continue to change their modus operandi in order to camouflage their shipments. 
The diversification of cocaine routes into Europe is continuing, with traffickers 
using different ports to insert their cocaine into containers. Nations such as Chile 
and Uruguay, with little history of drug trafficking, are becoming more popular for 
drug-trafficking organizations. An increase in the ‘rip on, rip off’ method of moving 
drugs, using unwitting companies and legal products to hide cocaine without the 
knowledge of owners, will continue apace, neutralizing European efforts to profile 
suspect companies and points of departure.
One senior European law enforcement official, who could not speak on the record, 
spoke of a recent phenomenon of ‘cloning’ containers. ‘We have intelligence reports 
of say a blue container with a certain registration number being placed onto a ship in 
Guayaquil, Ecuador, loaded up with cocaine. Then a green container with the same 
number is unloaded in Europe, with the same cargo, but no sign of the drugs. We 
never found that blue container, nor the cocaine,’ he said.
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It is not only the departure points from Latin America 
that are being changed, but reception points in 
Europe and Africa. With interdiction improving in the 
mega ports of Antwerp and Rotterdam, traffickers 
are looking at secondary ports throughout Europe. 
The interconnectedness of Europe, particularly the 
‘borderless’ EU, is a major advantage to traffickers and 
a disadvantage to interdiction efforts. As resilience to 
cocaine trafficking is stiffened in one nation, traffickers 
quickly and adroitly shift to another, meaning that the 
overall flow to Europe is maintained. As such, greater 
cooperation is the only way forward, not just within 
the EU, but with other nations, especially those in the 
Balkans, which remain outside the EU but have strong 
mafias involved in the cocaine trade.
Development of different smuggling 
methods
As cocaine seizures in containers increase, traffickers 
are starting to shift the methods for transporting  
drugs across the Atlantic. ‘Once we hit 20% seizures, 
then we are reaching a tipping point where traffickers 
start switching methods. Most of the experts I have 
spoken to think we have reached the tipping point. 
There are indications that criminals are now looking 
for different entry points and different methods. So, 
we may be about to see a change in the system of 
how cocaine is smuggled into Europe,’ said the senior 
European policeman.
‘Now we are seeing different ways to stash drugs on 
ships. We have seen torpedoes being used, which 
are stuck to the hull, and the discovery of the semi-
submersible in Spain was a wake-up call,’ he added, 
referring to the 2019 seizure of a narco submarine 
carrying 3 tonnes of cocaine off the coast of Galicia. 
There is clear evidence that more drug subs or 
semi-submersibles are being produced in Colombia. 
Colombian Admiral Hernando Mattos reported that 
27 drug subs had been seized in the first eight months 
of 2020 – 14 in Colombian waters and another 13 in 
international waters – along with more than 31 tonnes 
of cocaine that they were carrying.155 
Not only are the drug subs in their various forms very 
hard to detect, they are not affected by the coronavirus 
restrictions. Therefore, as cocaine piles up in South 
America, the subs are some of the few vessels that can 
cross the Atlantic without attracting attention. Looking 
ahead, the use of sailing vessels and pleasure craft to 
move drugs will likely increase as soon as coronavirus 
restrictions are lifted. Overall, however, containers will 
remain important for the foreseeable future.
Upstream presence of European mafias
The European criminal structures still able to put 
together multi-tonne loads of cocaine are those with 
well-established routes and presence in Latin America, 
able to negotiate with sellers, transporters and 
corruption cells to keep the flow of drugs moving.
Spanish authorities study the seized drug submarine.
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The Italian mafia and organized crime from the former 
Yugoslavian countries have led the way in developing 
these networks. According to Kevin Mills, Albanian 
criminals are now well placed, and their importance 
in the cocaine trade to Europe is likely to grow. ‘The 
Albanians have had quite a meteoric rise in the cocaine 
trade, operating in many parts of Europe, the UK and 
the Netherlands particularly. If anyone is going to have 
an advantage in the container trade, it is going to be the 
Albanians. They have a footprint in Latin America and 
at many exit points. They still conduct the face-to-face 
meetings by having people up here in the region.’
It is likely that the pandemic is pushing European drug-
trafficking organizations to increase their upstream 
presence. This will in turn promote the evolution of a 
new generation of brokers within Latin American and 
the Caribbean to feed the various European trafficking 
groups.
Strengthening of European drug-trafficking 
organizations
The growing profits from cocaine are providing a 
steady and lucrative stream of income for European 
drug-trafficking organizations. And it is not just the 
European consumer market that is strengthening 
criminal structures, but also money that can be made 
from cocaine in transit to other parts of the world. 
In the Netherlands, for example, InSight Crime field 
research found that Dutch criminal groups charge up 
to €3 000 (US$3 500) per kilogram to extract cocaine 
shipments from the port of Rotterdam. Given that 
seizures at Rotterdam reached 30 tonnes in 2019, 
suggesting an overall annual flow of around 100 tonnes 
of cocaine through the port, Dutch organized crime 
could be earning up to €300 million (US$355 million) on 
cocaine going through Rotterdam alone. Almost all of 
that cocaine was bound for other countries. Colombian 
underworld sources have told InSight Crime that 
Chinese and Australian markets are being aggressively 
developed, with the latter being especially lucrative, with 
a kilogram of cocaine worth well over US$100 000.
European drug-trafficking organizations are also 
strengthened by the common practice of traffickers 
handling a wide portfolio of illegal narcotics, and 
therefore engaging in drug exchanges, for example by 
swapping heroin for cocaine. This allows the European 
trafficking groups to maximize profits and quickly adjust 
to changes in consumer markets.
More downstream presence of Latin 
American drug-trafficking organizations
It is not just the European criminals who are seeking 
to maximize profits by participating in as much of the 
supply and retail chains as possible. Latin American 
criminals, especially the Colombians, have been selling 
cocaine in Europe for some four decades. 
However, the rise of home deliveries and online 
sales, boosted by the coronavirus crisis, has spread 
into the drug trade, meaning the traditional criminal 
control of ‘turf’ to facilitate retail sales has become 
less important, at least for now. This means that Latin 
American structures based in Europe have also been 
able to engage in more direct sales in Europe, using not 
only the dark web, but also more common encrypted-
communication applications such as WhatsApp.
It is also worth noting here that the division between 
Latin American and European organized crime is itself 
becoming an ever more artificial construct. Most of 
the cocaine networks operating into Europe have 
many different nationalities working together, making 
the division of which particular nationality controls 
which link in the chain harder and harder to define. 
Also, different criminal structures, both European and 
Latin American, ‘pool’ shipments, meaning that they all 
share in the profits and spread the losses in the case of 
interdiction. The days of focusing exclusively on a single 
drug-trafficking organization or national mafia in the 
hope of dismantling the cocaine trade are long gone.
Use of encryption technology to broker 
deals 
Due to the fact that European buyers and Latin 
American sellers have not been able to meet as easily 
face to face due to the coronavirus restrictions, the 
use of encryption technology has taken on a new 
significance to close cocaine deals.
The importance and popularity of encrypted 
communications for criminals was revealed in July 
2020, when European law enforcement agencies broke 
the EncroChat system.156 Dutch police alone seized 
10 tonnes of cocaine during the resulting Operation 
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Venetic. British police revealed that an estimated 10 000 
criminals in the UK alone paid £1 500 (around US$2 000) 
for a six-month contract for the EncroChat handsets. As 
mentioned above, encryption technology is also used 
to retail drugs in Europe, although this is still a small 
percentage of the market.
Increase in drug-related violence 
Europol has warned of growing violence in Europe 
linked to cocaine-trade conflicts as more actors seek 
a slice of an ever-growing pie. While murder rates are 
still relatively low, drug-related violence is becoming 
more common and ostentatious (e.g. the Dutch Taghi 
organization, or the Montenegrin Škaljari and Kavač 
clans).157 There have been reports of Italian organized-
crime figures being murdered in Germany158 and Balkan 
criminal assassinations in the Netherlands as cocaine 
networks settle scores.159 
However, it is generally accepted that the use of 
extreme violence is counterproductive in the long term, 
attracting the attention of law enforcement and forcing 
politicians to take action. In Latin America, proponents 
of extreme violence, such as the Zetas in Mexico, have 
been the target of extended national and international 
offensives that allowed lower profile groups, such as 
the Sinaloa Cartel, to operate with greater freedom. 
However, in Europe, some of the rising drug-trafficking 
organizations, such as the Albanian organized-
crime groups, have made use of violence to position 
themselves.160 It does seem however that, reputations 
having been established, many Balkan mafia networks 
are scaling back violence and concentrating on 
promoting business, according to British NCA sources.
The most sophisticated criminal groups, both Latin 
American and European, are increasingly turning to 
the application of corruption. ‘Corruption is creeping 
up slowly in Western societies in a way we have not 
seen before. 10 years ago, if you found a corrupt port 
official or customs agent, this was huge news. Now it is 
becoming more common,’ said the senior  
European policeman. 
The rise of the ‘invisibles’ 
Many of the more sophisticated drug traffickers have 
realized that their best protection lies not in a private 
army and extensive security, but rather in keeping a 
very low profile. These traffickers, whom we call ‘the 
invisibles,’ make Herculean efforts to remain off the 
radar of authorities, using brokers and ensuring they 
have no digital or social media footprint, as well as 
maintaining a solid legal facade for their business.
‘There are indications of very smart traffickers, 
moving huge quantities of cocaine, without attracting 
much attention,’ said the senior European policeman. 
‘European police do not have the complete overview 
of the business and we tend to focus on those that 
use violence. In Spain there are Brits, Dutch and other 
mobsters with no criminal records moving a lot of dope. 
Law enforcement is falling behind.’
InSight Crime profiled a Colombian ‘invisible’ living in 
Spain who for years moved cocaine into Europe and 
who at the time of writing has no arrest warrants 
pending on either side of the Atlantic.161 Guillermo 
Acevedo, alias ‘Memo Fantasma’ (Will the Ghost), 
is now under investigation by both Colombian and 
Spanish authorities as a result of our investigation.
Europe as a money-laundering centre
Europe is a major money-laundering centre, and among 
the worst offenders are some of the more ‘respectable’ 
countries such as the UK and the Netherlands.162 These 
countries have shown little appetite for serious reform, 
while eastern European nations have much lower 
appetite for tackling the influx of drug money into the 
economy and into the political arenas. Brexit could 
further exacerbate this, with the NCA saying laundering 
opportunities will increase as resilience lowers along 
with cooperation with the EU.163
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The trafficking of illicit drugs in Central America has been widely doc-umented in recent years, as the region plays a key role in the traf-ficking of cocaine from South America to Mexico and the United 
States, as well as markets further abroad. Nevertheless, the illicit sale of 
pharmaceuticals in Central America also constitutes a phenomenon that 
is rapidly evolving, appears to be growing, and has garnered relatively 
little international attention outside of pharmaceutical, law enforcement, 
and public health circles.
This paper seeks to fill in critical gaps in the existing knowledge base, 
and offers a starting point for further inquiry by focusing on two Central 
American case studies, Costa Rica and Guatemala. It aims to better un-
derstand the scope and scale of the trade in counterfeit and black-mar-
ket pharmaceuticals in Central America as well as the modus operandi of 
counterfeit and black-market pharmaceutical traffickers, their smuggling 
routes, and the potential involvement of well-established criminal groups 
in this burgeoning industry. It seeks to identify the key factors that are 
driving consumer demand for counterfeit and black-market pharmaceuti-
cals in both Costa Rica and Guatemala, and to better understand govern-
ment and private sector responses to this growing problem. Additionally, 
the paper identifies specific areas where government and private sector 
responses could be more effective, and highlights emerging trends that 
could shape the counterfeit and black-market pharmaceutical economy in 
the near and medium term. 
To that end, this report is separated into four main sections. Section I offers 
a global and regional overview of the illicit sale of pharmaceuticals. Sections 
II and III examine Costa Rica and Guatemala as case studies, with a par-
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To read more, click here. 
Through the Resilience Fund, the GI-TOC has invested in community initiatives 
focused on addressing the issue of extortion in the region. This led to the 
partnership with Colectivo Artesana, a Guatemalan NGO that works with 
women in prison and families of prisoners. 
The GI-TOC has established an observatory of illicit economies in Central 
America to monitor and analyze crime and risk in the region and help develop 
programmes to combat organized crime.
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